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SW Accounting documentation MCP server

com.sw-cpas/docs-mcpsw-cpas.comstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Search and read sw-cpas.com pages and articles as markdown. Read-only, no sign-in.

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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What the SW Accounting documentation MCP server can do

The SW Accounting documentation MCP server is published by sw-cpas.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools read private data (search_docs and fetch_doc); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (fetch_doc); 1 tool can send data out of your system (fetch_doc). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • fetch_docReturn one page or article of sw-cpas.com as markdown with YAML front matter.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_doc" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "fetch_doc" says "fetch" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one page or article of sw-cpas.com as markdown with YAML front matter. Accepts a full URL or a path such as /dental-cpa/ or /agents.md, usually taken from search_docs results. URLs on other sites are refused.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch a document
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_docsSearch the pages and articles of sw-cpas.com, including the developer, API and agent documentation.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the pages and articles of sw-cpas.com, including the developer, API and agent documentation. Use it to find which page answers a question; returns titles, URLs and markdown URLs, best match first. Read a result with fetch_doc.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search documentation
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__docs__fetch_doc"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://sw-cpas.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/docs
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http docs https://sw-cpas.com/mcp/docs
claude mcp add --transport http docs https://sw-cpas.com/mcp/docs

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__docs__search_docs"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__docs__fetch_doc"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docs. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__docs__search_docs private-data
  • mcp__docs__fetch_doc private-data, untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.sw-cpas/docs-mcp/verify?hash=4a153b359d9d26af9739104a477cfaa8cccf229141fbbf2fc4fcae08b8b88db7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4a153b359d9d, from Nov 16, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.sw-cpas/docs-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.sw-cpas/docs-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.sw-cpas/docs-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.sw-cpas/docs-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

SW Accounting documentation MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SW Accounting documentation MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the SW Accounting documentation MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the SW Accounting documentation MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the SW Accounting documentation MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. search_docs and fetch_doc.

Does the SW Accounting documentation MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SW Accounting documentation MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch_doc.

Has the SW Accounting documentation MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.