Teetra MCP server
com.teetra/teetrateetra.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Find and call verified APIs from any AI assistant, with free trial calls and previewed writes.
5 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, OAuth metadata published. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Teetra MCP server can do
The Teetra MCP server is published by teetra.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: invoke and confirm) and create or change data (2 tools: authorize and account). 1 tool only reads.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (invoke, discover, confirm and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in and publishes OAuth metadata.
Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
confirmPreview and approve a pending action by its pending_id.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "preview": a word for reading.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Preview and approve a pending action by its pending_id. Used when a write requires user confirmation before running.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Confirm Action
invokeDo what the user asks using a verified API on Teetra.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "invoke" says "invoke": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Do what the user asks using a verified API on Teetra. Starts as a free trial; results come back as data.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Invoke Action
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
accountCheck your remaining free trial calls or subscription allowance across services.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check your remaining free trial calls or subscription allowance across services. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Account Status
authorizeConnect your own account or API key for a service to continue past the free trial.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Connect your own account or API key for a service to continue past the free trial. Accepts an API key or token, or delivers a sign-in link.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Authorize Service
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
discoverFind matching APIs and actions for what the user wants to do without running them.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Find matching APIs and actions for what the user wants to do without running them. Optionally filter by domain. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Discover Capabilities
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:48 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 401
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- https://app.teetra.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://app.teetra.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://app.teetra.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://app.teetra.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 401; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 3 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to yes
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: none to https://app.teetra.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http teetra https://app.teetra.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http teetra https://app.teetra.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__teetra__discover"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__teetra__authorize",
"mcp__teetra__account"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__teetra__invoke",
"mcp__teetra__confirm"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as teetra. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__teetra__invoke untrusted-input
- mcp__teetra__discover untrusted-input
- mcp__teetra__confirm untrusted-input
- mcp__teetra__authorize untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.teetra/teetra/verify?hash=a110615a77657f303bc2338a64026d560a5e44f8d8ae406ec8ae2d24c07c60d6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a110615a7765, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:56 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.teetra/teetra/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.teetra/teetra)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:06 UTC.
Teetra MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Teetra MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Teetra MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: invoke and confirm.
Can the Teetra MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Teetra MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. invoke, confirm, authorize, account and discover.
Does the Teetra MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and it publishes OAuth protected resource metadata (RFC 9728); its authorization server supports dynamic client registration.
Does the Teetra MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Teetra MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.