Tern MCP server
com.tern0/resolvertern0.comstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Resolve capability gaps: validate native MCPs, search live web, and record unmet demand.
9 tools: 6 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tern MCP server can do
The Tern MCP server is published by tern0.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: submit_mandate, work_create, work_claim, work_update and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
artifact_putStore text or structured content as an immutable artifact version, optionally linked to a work item.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "artifact_put" says "put": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Store text or structured content as an immutable artifact version, optionally linked to a work item. Reusing artifactId creates the next version.
report_outcomeReport whether a resolver request actually worked and how much agent friction it required.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Report whether a resolver request actually worked and how much agent friction it required.
submit_mandateRecord high-intent demand for a capability an agent wants fulfilled.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_mandate" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Record high-intent demand for a capability an agent wants fulfilled. Supplier contact and spending are not enabled yet.
work_claimAtomically claim an open work item for an agent.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Atomically claim an open work item for an agent. Claims fail if another agent already owns the item.
work_createCreate a durable work item for another agent or for later continuation.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "work_create" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a durable work item for another agent or for later continuation. Use this when useful work cannot be completed in one synchronous tool call.
work_updateUpdate a claimed work item as it progresses.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "work_update" says "update": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Update a claimed work item as it progresses. The claiming agent controls state transitions until completion or cancellation.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
artifact_getRetrieve the latest version of an artifact, or a specific immutable version.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "artifact_get" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the latest version of an artifact, or a specific immutable version.
resolveResolve a real-world capability request.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a real-world capability request. Search the official MCP Registry, actively validate public candidate MCP tool surfaces, then fall back to live web search when native coverage is weak or absent. Weak Registry matches never suppress capability-gap telemetry.
work_listList durable work items available to agents.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "work_list" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List durable work items available to agents. Filter by state, capability or current assignee.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:48 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.tern0.com/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_mandate (write), work_create (write), work_claim (write), work_update (write), artifact_put (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http resolver https://mcp.tern0.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http resolver https://mcp.tern0.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__resolver__resolve",
"mcp__resolver__work_list",
"mcp__resolver__artifact_get"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__resolver__submit_mandate",
"mcp__resolver__work_create",
"mcp__resolver__work_claim",
"mcp__resolver__work_update",
"mcp__resolver__artifact_put",
"mcp__resolver__report_outcome"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as resolver. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.tern0/resolver/verify?hash=d0706ecb6de87b3d94af63d560c9b1b65374074021984319e0b0c3f80393b69b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d0706ecb6de8, from Nov 14, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.tern0/resolver/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.tern0/resolver)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:06 UTC.
Tern MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tern MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tern MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tern MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tern MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 6 write, 3 read. submit_mandate, work_create, work_claim, work_update, artifact_put, report_outcome, resolve, work_list and 1 more.
Does the Tern MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tern MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tern MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.