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Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server

com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agentstextforagents.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Standing minted only from signed settlement receipts, never reviews. Verdicts: ACCEPT to DECLINE.

6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server can do

The Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server is published by textforagents.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_standing, ingest_receipt, post_escrow and register_principal), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool can send data out of your system (post_escrow).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_standingPre-acceptance standing check $0.02 (trial/fleet apply)No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pre-acceptance standing check $0.02 (trial/fleet apply)
  • ingest_receiptIngest rail-signed settlement receiptNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ingest rail-signed settlement receipt
  • post_escrowPost rail-signed escrow postureCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_escrow" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_escrow" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Post rail-signed escrow posture
  • register_principalRegister principal identity (groups link only on a rail-signed identity_link)No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register principal identity (groups link only on a rail-signed identity_link)
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_alertsFleet verdict-change alerts (undelivered; reading marks delivered)No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_alerts" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fleet verdict-change alerts (undelivered; reading marks delivered)
  • get_standingPublished standing class + publication stateNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_standing" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Published standing class + publication state

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://textforagents.com/products/principal-reputation-for-agents/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_standing (write), ingest_receipt (write), post_escrow (write), register_principal (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http principal-reputation-for-agents https://textforagents.com/products/principal-reputation-for-agents/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http principal-reputation-for-agents https://textforagents.com/products/principal-reputation-for-agents/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__get_standing",
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__get_alerts"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__check_standing",
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__ingest_receipt",
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__post_escrow",
      "mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__register_principal"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as principal-reputation-for-agents. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__principal-reputation-for-agents__post_escrow outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agents/verify?hash=bbafba1b39036de726717a41229894add2513599db0bc6f9c8ab34708d707e96" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bbafba1b3903, from Nov 8, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agents/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agents
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agents.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.textforagents/principal-reputation-for-agents)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server have?

6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. check_standing, ingest_receipt, post_escrow, register_principal, get_standing and get_alerts.

Does the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): post_escrow.

Has the Principal Reputation for Agents MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.