The JQ API MCP server
com.thejqapi/jq-apithejqapi.comstreamable-httpv2.5.0Scanned
Free hosted jq MCP server for inline JSON, public HTTPS URLs, and reusable 15-minute uploads.
6 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- 10 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the The JQ API MCP server can do
The The JQ API MCP server is published by thejqapi.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_upload), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (purchase_access) and create or change data (2 tools: process_json and upload_json). 2 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (process_json, upload_json and purchase_access); 2 tools can send data out of your system (process_json and upload_json).
The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention, long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 5 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 2.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
delete_uploadPermanently delete only the JSON upload identified by upload_id; other uploads, filters, modules, and quota records are unaffected.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_upload" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The description says "Permanently delete".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...d; a UUID quota key is not an ownership credential. Returns success:true,deleted:true even..."
Description, as the server wrote it Permanently delete only the JSON upload identified by upload_id; other uploads, filters, modules, and quota records are unaffected. Use after the final process_json query or when early removal is needed. Use get_upload to inspect availability first if uncertain; do not delete while the ID is still needed. Pass the exact secret ID returned by upload_json or REST POST /uploads, not a filename or URL. Anyone holding that ID can delete the upload; a UUID quota key is not an ownership credential. Returns success:true,deleted:true even if already deleted or expired, so retries are safe. Reusing a deleted ID for processing fails. Does not consume processing quota and remains available when that quota is exhausted. Invalid ID arguments are rejected; storage failure returns success:false,error,status:503.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
purchase_accessPurchase or resume a prepaid access pass for the UUID configured in the MCP client Authorization header.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "purchase_access" says "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tries. The UUID remains a secret bearer credential and must never be included in arguments..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.purchase_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.purchase_id.description: "...purchase. This is not your UUID bearer credential."
Description, as the server wrote it Purchase or resume a prepaid access pass for the UUID configured in the MCP client Authorization header. The fixed price is 2 USDC for 30 days of unlimited jq queries and zero application query logs; each renewal is a separate purchase after expiration. Use only when paid access is wanted; use get_quota to inspect active access first. An active pass returns its status without charging again. Discovery and status checks are free. Expired paid UUIDs reject queries until renewed and never fall back to tracked free access, even after old billing records are deleted. Browser wallet checkout and private MCP settings are available at https://thejqapi.com/access; ordinary MCP clients need no wallet after payment. Requires an x402-capable client with a funded wallet and an explicit spending policy allowing 2 USDC. The initial tool error contains standard x402 v2 PaymentRequired data. Retry with the signed payment in request _meta["x402/payment"], never in arguments. The optional purchase_id resumes an earlier order; keep the same order on retries. The UUID remains a secret bearer credential and must never be included in arguments. Returns active status or a purchase_id, settlement status, transaction receipt, and expires_at when activated. A pending settlement must be checked again without a new payment. Invalid input is 400, missing UUID 401, unavailable purchase 404, conflicting or expired order 409, and disabled/unavailable billing 503. Purchases are live with native USDC on Base mainnet (eip155:8453). The pass preserves 5 MiB document and 15-minute upload limits. Minimal billing/access records and explicitly requested uploads are retained separately. Payments are public onchain; Cloudflare infrastructure policies apply. GET https://thejqapi.com/pricing reports current availability.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
process_jsonApply a jq filter and return JSON results; this does not create or modify uploads.Reads text others writeCan send data out4 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "apply": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...directs and ten seconds, without caller credentials or private networks. Upload IDs expire..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "...URL to fetch as input, up to 5 MiB. No credentials, private addresses, or custom headers."
- Info
The description is 2,240 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...rchase_access only under an authorized spending policy; otherwise wait for reset."
- Warn
The server marks "process_json" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "apply": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Apply a jq filter and return JSON results; this does not create or modify uploads. Choose exactly one source: input for an available JSON value, url for a public HTTPS document, or upload_id to reuse stored JSON. For a single query, pass input or url directly; use upload_json first only when several queries should reuse one document. For example, filter .name extracts a field, keys inspects structure, and . reads the complete document, including an upload. To check upload availability or remaining quota without running jq, use get_upload or get_quota. Document limit 5 MiB; URL fetches allow three redirects and ten seconds, without caller credentials or private networks. Upload IDs expire 15 minutes after creation. Anyone holding an ID can query, inspect, or delete that upload. Runs real jq in isolated WebAssembly memory. Supply modules as options.modules filenames mapped to source on each call; they disappear afterward and need no separate management. Returns success, result, rawResult, results (every emitted jq value), stdout, jqVersion, executionTime, and optional stderr. Free-tier processing uses one shared daily REST/MCP quota call: 100 per IP or 1,000 per client-configured UUID bearer token, resetting at midnight UTC. Both free and paid keep JSON, filters, results, and source URLs out of application logs. Active prepaid UUIDs additionally skip IP/UUID daily counters, query counts, and source analytics, with unlimited queries and zero application query logs. Expired paid UUIDs reject queries until renewed, without free-tier tracking. Use get_quota to inspect active access. Minimal billing records, explicit uploads, public payments, and Cloudflare infrastructure boundaries are disclosed at https://thejqapi.com/privacy. jq failures return success:false and error; input failures may include status 400 (invalid), 404 (missing upload), 410 (expired), 413 (too large), 415 (unsupported data), 502/504 (URL failure/timeout), or 503 (storage unavailable). Quota exhaustion returns a tool error with remaining:0, reset_at, a structured upgrade offer linking pricing and browser checkout, and reset details in _meta.rateLimit. Use purchase_access only under an authorized spending policy; otherwise wait for reset.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
upload_jsonStore one JSON document in private temporary storage for repeated process_json queries; this does not run a jq filter.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "upload_json" says "upload": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...public HTTPS JSON on port 443, without credentials, private addresses, or custom headers...."
- Info
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "...d store, up to 5 MiB. Port 443 only; no credentials, private networks, or custom headers. C..."
Description, as the server wrote it Store one JSON document in private temporary storage for repeated process_json queries; this does not run a jq filter. Use when the same input will be queried more than once. For a single query, pass input or url directly to process_json instead. Provide exactly one of input or url, never both. A local file must be sent to REST POST /uploads by the client; this tool cannot read local paths. Maximum 5 MiB; URLs must be public HTTPS JSON on port 443, without credentials, private addresses, or custom headers. URL fetching is bounded to three redirects and ten seconds. Returns success:true, a secret upload_id, expires_at (UTC), and size_bytes. The ID is reusable for 15 minutes; uploads do not refresh expiration when queried. Uploads are immutable: create a new upload to change the JSON, then delete the old ID. Anyone holding the ID can inspect, query, or delete it. Use get_upload for metadata, process_json for contents or filtering, and delete_upload for early cleanup. Consumes one shared daily quota call on the free tier; active prepaid passes bypass that counter. Retrying creates another upload. No signup; a UUID bearer header selects the access tier but does not establish upload ownership. Failures return success:false and error, with status 400 for invalid input/URL/JSON, 413 for oversize data, 415 for unsupported content, 502/504 for URL failures, or 503 for storage failure. Exhausted quota returns a tool error with remaining:0, reset_at, and a structured upgrade offer linking pricing and checkout; inspect _meta.rateLimit for limit and reset.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_quotaRead the current caller’s shared daily REST/MCP quota without consuming a call or creating a usage record.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_quota" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...lient Authorization header. Do not pass credentials as tool arguments. Free-tier results co..."
Description, as the server wrote it Read the current caller’s shared daily REST/MCP quota without consuming a call or creating a usage record. Use before a batch of processing/upload calls or after quota exhaustion to learn when to retry. This does not inspect, process, upload, or delete JSON. Takes no arguments: the server uses the request IP, or the UUID bearer token configured in the MCP client Authorization header. Do not pass credentials as tool arguments. Free-tier results contain success, tier (anonymous or uuid), limit, used, remaining, and reset_at (next midnight UTC). Limits are 100 calls per IP or 1,000 per UUID. Uploads and jq processing share this counter; metadata checks, deletion, and discovery are free. Active prepaid access returns tier:paid, unlimited:true, expires_at, privacy:zero_application_query_logs, auto_renew:false, and null allowance/count fields because paid query activity is not recorded. remaining is zero after exhaustion; used counts attempted charged calls and can exceed the limit. This is a point-in-time snapshot, not a reservation for concurrent requests. Quota UUIDs do not authenticate an account or grant upload ownership. Database failure returns a tool error with success:false,error,status:503; no JSON or caller identifier is returned.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_uploadInspect one upload’s availability, expiration, and byte size without reading its contents, running jq, or extending its lifetime.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_upload" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect one upload’s availability, expiration, and byte size without reading its contents, running jq, or extending its lifetime. Use before reusing an older upload_id or to check whether deletion or expiration has made it unavailable. To read contents, use process_json with upload_id and filter ".". To remove it, use delete_upload. Pass the exact secret upload_id returned by upload_json or REST POST /uploads. No upload listing is exposed; anyone holding an ID can inspect that one upload. Returns success, available, status (available, missing, or expired), expires_at (UTC), expires_in_seconds, and size_bytes. Missing/deleted and expired uploads return available:false and size_bytes:null as a successful status check; expiration reports zero seconds. Does not consume processing quota or change stored data. Invalid IDs are rejected; a storage failure returns success:false,error,status:503.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://thejqapi.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_upload (destructive), purchase_access (irreversible), process_json (write), upload_json (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 15, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnprocess_json
The server marks "process_json" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "apply": a word for a change.
- Infoprocess_json
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...directs and ten seconds, without caller credentials or private networks. Upload IDs expire..."
- Infoprocess_json
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "...URL to fetch as input, up to 5 MiB. No credentials, private addresses, or custom headers."
- Infoprocess_json
The description is 2,240 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...rchase_access only under an authorized spending policy; otherwise wait for reset."
- Infoupload_json
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...public HTTPS JSON on port 443, without credentials, private addresses, or custom headers...."
- Infoupload_json
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "...d store, up to 5 MiB. Port 443 only; no credentials, private networks, or custom headers. C..."
Show 4 more findingsShow fewer
- Infodelete_upload
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...d; a UUID quota key is not an ownership credential. Returns success:true,deleted:true even..."
- Infoget_quota
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...lient Authorization header. Do not pass credentials as tool arguments. Free-tier results co..."
- Infopurchase_access
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tries. The UUID remains a secret bearer credential and must never be included in arguments..."
- Infopurchase_access
The input schema at properties.purchase_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.purchase_id.description: "...purchase. This is not your UUID bearer credential."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:process_jsonChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:purchase_accessCan't be undonedescription
- Changed:upload_jsonChanges thingsdescription
Tools1 added, 3 changed.+1 added~3 changedView diff
- Added:purchase_accessCan't be undone
- Changed:get_quotaOnly readsdescription
- Changed:process_jsonChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:upload_jsonChanges thingsdescription
Tools4 added, 2 removed, 1 changed.+4 added−2 removed~1 changedView diff
- Added:get_quotaOnly reads
- Added:get_uploadOnly reads
- Added:process_jsonChanges things
- Added:upload_jsonChanges things
- Removed:process
- Removed:upload
- Changed:delete_uploadDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools2 added, 1 changed.+2 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:delete_uploadDeletes or cancels
- Added:uploadChanges things
- Changed:processChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:processChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http jq-api https://thejqapi.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http jq-api https://thejqapi.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__jq-api__get_upload",
"mcp__jq-api__get_quota"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__jq-api__process_json",
"mcp__jq-api__upload_json",
"mcp__jq-api__purchase_access"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__jq-api__delete_upload"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as jq-api. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__jq-api__process_json untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__jq-api__upload_json untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__jq-api__purchase_access untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.thejqapi/jq-api/verify?hash=73a0994bd469ac92ae5369478d9c1dadd53bd47fcb6f388e6cb0114b048c202d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 73a0994bd469, from Nov 8, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thejqapi/jq-api/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thejqapi/jq-api)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
The JQ API MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the The JQ API MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the The JQ API MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_upload.
Can the The JQ API MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: purchase_access.
What tools does the The JQ API MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. delete_upload, purchase_access, process_json, upload_json, get_upload and get_quota.
Does the The JQ API MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the The JQ API MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): process_json and upload_json.
Has the The JQ API MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 5 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.