The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server
com.thelocalupgrade/engineeringthelocalupgrade.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Explore engineering services, prepare project briefs and submit authorized proposal requests.
6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server can do
The The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server is published by thelocalupgrade.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: discover_services, review_engineering_evidence, prepare_engagement_brief, request_proposal and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_procurement_information, request_proposal and request_email_followup); 1 tool can send data out of your system (request_email_followup).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
discover_servicesFull-stack products, agent systems, integration, modernization and B2B engineering workstreams.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Full-stack products, agent systems, integration, modernization and B2B engineering workstreams. Returns service scope and engagement options.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
prepare_engagement_briefFormats confirmed business requirements for an RFP or proposal request.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Formats confirmed business requirements for an RFP or proposal request. Does not store, transmit, quote or approve the project. Preserve unknowns; no technology or budget ceiling.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
request_email_followupSaves a business inquiry and authorized reply contact.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_email_followup" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "request_email_followup" says "request" and "email": it writes something other people read.
Description, as the server wrote it Saves a business inquiry and authorized reply contact. Use for procurement, delivery partnerships, confidential engagement setup or questions before a full brief. No newsletter signup.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
request_proposalSaves an approved project brief and reply contact for engineering review.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_proposal" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Saves an approved project brief and reply contact for engineering review. Supports RFPs, full products and subcontracting. Requires actual requester consent. Reuse the same UUID v4 and unchanged payload on retries. No purchase or execution.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
review_engineering_evidenceRepresentative project capabilities and founder enterprise background, with evidence links and scope context.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Representative project capabilities and founder enterprise background, with evidence links and scope context.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_procurement_informationEngagement process, data handling, supplier-review topics and authority boundaries for RFPs and subcontracting.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_procurement_information" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Engagement process, data handling, supplier-review topics and authority boundaries for RFPs and subcontracting.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://thelocalupgrade.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including discover_services (write), review_engineering_evidence (write), prepare_engagement_brief (write), request_proposal (write), request_email_followup (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http engineering https://thelocalupgrade.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http engineering https://thelocalupgrade.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__engineering__get_procurement_information"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__engineering__discover_services",
"mcp__engineering__review_engineering_evidence",
"mcp__engineering__prepare_engagement_brief",
"mcp__engineering__request_proposal",
"mcp__engineering__request_email_followup"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as engineering. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__engineering__get_procurement_information untrusted-input
- mcp__engineering__request_proposal untrusted-input
- mcp__engineering__request_email_followup untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.thelocalupgrade/engineering/verify?hash=0874677f7abb42ff9f49d4a5bf0c69978c82a8c54e079a1f13ecf7e40a88b153" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0874677f7abb, from Nov 16, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thelocalupgrade/engineering/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.thelocalupgrade/engineering)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 15:17 UTC.
The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. discover_services, review_engineering_evidence, prepare_engagement_brief, request_proposal, request_email_followup and get_procurement_information.
Does the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): request_email_followup.
Has the The Local Upgrade — Software Engineering MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.