TridentStack Control Docs MCP server
com.tridentstack/docstridentstack.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Search and read TridentStack Control documentation: patching, vulnerabilities, compliance, API.
3 tools: 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server can do
The TridentStack Control Docs MCP server is published by tridentstack.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
3 tools read private data (search_docs, get_doc and list_docs); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (list_docs).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_docReturn the full markdown of a single documentation chunk by its id (from a search_docs result).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_doc" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_doc" says "get" and "doc": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the full markdown of a single documentation chunk by its id (from a search_docs result). Only ids present in the index are valid; this never fetches arbitrary URLs.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
list_docsList the documentation catalog (id, title, source, url), optionally filtered to one content type.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_docs" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "list_docs" says "list" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List the documentation catalog (id, title, source, url), optionally filtered to one content type. Use to browse structure before searching.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
search_docsFull-text search over TridentStack Control's customer documentation (guides, API reference, changelog, roadmap).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Full-text search over TridentStack Control's customer documentation (guides, API reference, changelog, roadmap). Returns ranked results with titles, URLs, and snippets. Use this first to find relevant docs, then get_doc to read one in full. It also covers reference formats, including the Endpoint Checks import file format, so an assistant can write a check file a customer imports. Before writing or making calls to the TridentStack Control REST API, search for "API rate limits and efficient polling": it explains which endpoints answer a question in the fewest requests and how to handle a 429.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http docs https://docs.tridentstack.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http docs https://docs.tridentstack.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__docs__search_docs",
"mcp__docs__get_doc",
"mcp__docs__list_docs"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docs. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__docs__search_docs private-data
- mcp__docs__get_doc private-data
- mcp__docs__list_docs private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.tridentstack/docs/verify?hash=8d66b447fdafe59c0f4bb1114bbf57b261122e3b18083cb6219d8dc3e6f5a9b6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8d66b447fdaf, from Nov 18, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.tridentstack/docs/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.tridentstack/docs)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
TridentStack Control Docs MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 read. search_docs, get_doc and list_docs.
Does the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the TridentStack Control Docs MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.