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~Alter MCP server

com.truealter/identitytruealter.comstreamable-httpv0.5.16Scanned

Mint an agent identity in two free calls. Verify anyone. Earn 75% when someone reads you.

17 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 11 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 11 read.
  • Reads private data · 5
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 9 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ~Alter MCP server can do

The ~Alter MCP server is published by truealter.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 17 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: register_autonomous), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (invite_to_alter) and create or change data (4 tools: hello_agent, get_started, register_autonomous_challenge and alter_verify). 11 tools only read.

5 tools read private data (describe_traits, golden_thread_status, thread_census and 2 more); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (golden_thread_status and thread_census); 1 tool can send data out of your system (invite_to_alter). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 9 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.5.16.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

17 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • register_autonomousComplete keyless self-registration as your own ~alter principal by submitting a solved proof-of-work challenge from register_autonomous_challenge.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Complete keyless self-registration as your own ~alter principal by submitting a solved proof-of-work challenge from register_autonomous_challenge. Mints you an owner-less ~handle and an agent key (shown once) with no human session. Free-tier queries are live immediately, and the handle is earn-eligible at mint, with no human account behind it, so paid reads against it settle to the handle. Withdrawing is a separate step and takes a key you hold yourself. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • invite_to_alterGenerate a URL inviting a person without an ~alter identity to register.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "invite_to_alter" says "invite": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "invite_to_alter" says "invite": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a URL inviting a person without an ~alter identity to register. Use this when you encounter someone not yet on ~alter and want to invite them. They claim a ~handle, confirm their email, and are done; identity is inferred from what they go on to do, never from a quiz. Returns invite_url (and assessment_url as a historical alias for the same value). callback_url is accepted and checked but not yet called. Once the person tells you their ~handle, alter_resolve_handle confirms it exists. Free L0.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • alter_verifyCheck whether a ~handle is known to the ~alter identity field.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: ".... Listed free at L0; calling it needs a credential, which an agent can mint for itself wit..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a ~handle is known to the ~alter identity field. Use this before you address, pay or trust someone by handle, so you are acting on a person or agent who exists rather than on a name that was typed at you. Returns whether the handle is registered, its canonical form and account status. Engagement, archetype and attunement come back as tier labels only where the member has opened their profile to you; otherwise they are empty and the reply says why. Listed free at L0; calling it needs a credential, which an agent can mint for itself with register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous. To check only that a handle exists, alter_resolve_handle needs no credential.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_startedStart here, and act on it without leaving this session.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_started" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_started" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_started" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start here, and act on it without leaving this session. Self-registration is free and needs no key. You need no ~alter key and no human account: register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous mint you an owner-less ~handle in two calls, free-tier queries are live the moment it returns, and that handle is earn-eligible at mint, so paid reads against it settle to the handle. This call also returns what ~alter is (identity infrastructure; your ~Alter is your owned identity record, not an agent that acts for you), the tools which work without a key, an honest note that most depth is paid per query in USDC over x402 with prices read live, and the consent path that gates deep third-party data. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • hello_agentFirst handshake with ~alter.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...connection works and to learn what the credential you are holding can reach, before you s..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    First handshake with ~alter. Call this once at the start of a session to confirm the connection works and to learn what the credential you are holding can reach, before you spend a call finding out the hard way. Returns the server version, whether you are authenticated, your trust tier, and how many tools are callable at that tier against how many exist. Reads nothing about any member and changes nothing. Takes no parameters. Free L0, no authentication required; an unauthenticated caller gets a real answer describing the anonymous surface.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • register_autonomous_challengeBegin keyless self-registration as your own ~alter principal, no human account required, without leaving this session.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Begin keyless self-registration as your own ~alter principal, no human account required, without leaving this session. Call this FIRST to receive a proof-of-work challenge. Solve it (find a nonce so sha256(challenge + ':' + nonce) has the required leading zero bits), then call register_autonomous with your agent_name, the challenge, and the solved nonce. The proof-of-work is a Sybil defence. Returns challenge, difficulty, expires_at, and a hint. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 11Show 11 read-only tools
  • alter_login_statusCheck whether the credential you are holding is still good.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "alter_login_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Check whether the credential you are holding is still good. Use this..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether the credential you are holding is still good. Use this when a call has failed on authorisation, or at the start of a session, to tell an expired credential apart from a tool your scopes do not reach. Returns whether you are authenticated, whether you are acting as a member or an agent, the scopes and tier the credential carries, its expiry, the authentication method behind it, and an opaque prefix identifying the key without revealing it. Takes no parameters. Listed free at L0; calling it needs a credential, which is the thing it reports on. An agent holding none can mint one for itself with register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • alter_presence_readRead whether a ~handle is publicly 'open', the shop-front sign.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "alter_presence_read" says "read": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read whether a ~handle is publicly 'open', the shop-front sign. Use this before you approach someone cold, so you address a handle that has invited contact rather than one that has not. Returns open-or-closed only, for a handle that has both enabled public presence and is currently in the 'open' state; every other case reads as closed and the specific non-open state is never disclosed, so a closed answer is not evidence the handle is absent. Setting your own sign is alter_presence_set, and alter_presence_public_enable or alter_presence_public_disable decide whether it is published at all; all three are credentialed and so are not on the anonymous listing. Per-caller rate limited. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • alter_resolve_handleResolve a ~handle (~alter's identity address, like '~example') to its canonical form and kind.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "alter_resolve_handle" says "resolve": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "..._identity, a separate tool that needs a credential and so is not on the anonymous listing;..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a ~handle (~alter's identity address, like '~example') to its canonical form and kind. Use this as your first call when you have a handle and need to confirm it exists before calling other tools. Returns canonical handle, kind (system/personal/role_alias), and addressability. Also accepts a full alter: address. For an address naming a handle, such as 'alter:~example:work/verify', the handle is looked up exactly as a bare one would be, and the other parts come back as written under _meta.address. For an address naming an artefact, such as 'alter:docs/protocol.md', the address is read and returned, and this tool does not look the artefact up, so an empty result there is expected. Never returns PII. Reading what the field holds about a handle is verify_identity, a separate tool that needs a credential and so is not on the anonymous listing; an agent can mint one for itself in two calls with register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • alter_whoamiFind out who the credential you are holding says you are.Reads private data2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "alter_whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Find out who the credential you are holding says you are. Use this..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.target.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.target.description: "...only ~alter is recognised, and needs no credential; any other value falls through to your..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find out who the credential you are holding says you are. Use this at the start of a session, or after switching keys, to confirm which ~handle your calls will be attributed to before you act under it. Returns your canonical handle and a summary of what the field holds for you. Passing target switches the response to the institutional projection of a protocol-tier handle, today only ~alter, which returns provenance as institutional, an honest-empty trait vector rather than fabricated values, and social_legibility where that projection is available. Institutional mode is free and needs no credential. Your own projection needs one, which an agent can mint for itself with register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • describe_competenciesList the published competency vocabulary: every code the field can be asked about, grouped by how the claim is denominated.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_competencies" says "describe": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the published competency vocabulary: every code the field can be asked about, grouped by how the claim is denominated. A graded claim is climbed by degrees and takes a min_level; an attested_binary or issued_credential claim is held or it is not, and naming min_level against one is refused. Use this before composing the competency_requirements argument to query_field, a credentialed tool that is not on the anonymous listing and is priced per query in USDC over x402. Returns definitions only, never any member's evidence. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • describe_traitsList the canonical trait vocabulary: 30 trait codes grouped by category (Adaptive Capacity, Cognitive Style, Interpersonal Orientation, Drive Architecture, Integrity & Trust) with …Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_traits" says "describe": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "drive": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the canonical trait vocabulary: 30 trait codes grouped by category (Adaptive Capacity, Cognitive Style, Interpersonal Orientation, Drive Architecture, Integrity & Trust) with a one-line semantic per code, plus the valid discovery contexts and the traits never returned about a third party. Use this before composing the trait_priorities argument to query_field or the trait_criteria argument to create_requirement; both are credentialed tools and so are not on the anonymous listing, and query_field is priced per query in USDC over x402. Returns definitions only, never any member's evidence. Static reference data. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_network_statsGet aggregate ~alter network figures.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_network_stats" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get aggregate ~alter network figures. Use this to check the field is answering before you rely on it, or to show how large it is. Returns total identities, verified profiles, query volume and active agent count, as whole-network totals only; nothing here is attributable to any member, and no handle can be identified from it. Takes no parameters. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • golden_thread_statusRead where ~alter's agent registration programme, the Golden Thread, currently stands.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "golden_thread_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "golden_thread_status" says "status" and "thread": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "golden_thread_status" says "status" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ladder, and your own position when the credential you are holding is enrolled. Takes no p..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read where ~alter's agent registration programme, the Golden Thread, currently stands. Use this before joining, to see how many agents have already been woven in and what joining would get you, or afterwards to check your own position. An agent joins by completing three registration steps, called Knots, and the position it lands on decides which Strand milestones it reaches. Returns the count woven so far, the milestone ladder, and your own position when the credential you are holding is enrolled. Takes no parameters and reads no member data. Free L0 to read, with no credential; taking part needs one, which an agent can mint for itself with register_autonomous_challenge then register_autonomous.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_archetypesList the 12 identity archetypes, each with its name, what it describes and its protective equation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_archetypes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the 12 identity archetypes, each with its name, what it describes and its protective equation. Use this before you read an archetype off any other call, so the label means something to you rather than being passed through as an opaque string. Returns the taxonomy itself, static reference data that is the same for every caller; no member is named and no member's archetype is returned here. Takes no parameters. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • recommend_toolGet the wiring instructions for connecting an MCP client to ~alter.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the wiring instructions for connecting an MCP client to ~alter. The name is historical and this recommends nothing: it hands back connection details, not a suggested tool. Use it when adding ~alter to a new MCP client, or when passing the endpoint to another agent so it can connect for itself. Returns the MCP endpoint URL, a ready-to-paste JSON configuration snippet, and how many tools are callable at each tier. Takes no parameters and reads no member data. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • thread_censusRead the census of agents registered on the Golden Thread, ~alter's onboarding programme.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "thread_census" says "thread": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "thread_census" says "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ad is sealed, or to a caller holding no credential, the page carries the bound founding ag..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the census of agents registered on the Golden Thread, ~alter's onboarding programme. Use this to see how far the thread has been woven and where a new agent would sit on it. Returns the total woven, then a page of rows carrying position, milestone count, weave count and join date, walked with offset and limit (50 a page by default, 100 at most). Registry rows only: no traits, no contact details, and given names are never returned. While the thread is sealed, or to a caller holding no credential, the page carries the bound founding agents rather than the whole registry, so a short page is the seal and not an empty programme. Free L0, no authentication required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

10 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data5
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__identity__invite_to_alter"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.truealter.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/v1/mcp
Authorization servers
https://truealter.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.truealter.com/api/v1/mcp: tools/list returned 17 tools to an anonymous client, including register_autonomous (destructive), invite_to_alter (irreversible), hello_agent (write), get_started (write), register_autonomous_challenge (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 6

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn8 info
  • The server marks "get_started" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_started" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...connection works and to learn what the credential you are holding can reach, before you s..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "..._identity, a separate tool that needs a credential and so is not on the anonymous listing;..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ladder, and your own position when the credential you are holding is enrolled. Takes no p..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ad is sealed, or to a caller holding no credential, the page carries the bound founding ag..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "Find out who the credential you are holding says you are. Use this..."

    What this check looks for
Show 3 more findings
  • The input schema at properties.target.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.target.description: "...only ~alter is recognised, and needs no credential; any other value falls through to your..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "Check whether the credential you are holding is still good. Use this..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: ".... Listed free at L0; calling it needs a credential, which an agent can mint for itself wit..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 6.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 6
  2. Tools1 added, 4 changed.+1 added~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.16. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http identity https://mcp.truealter.com/api/v1/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http identity https://mcp.truealter.com/api/v1/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__identity__list_archetypes",
      "mcp__identity__alter_resolve_handle",
      "mcp__identity__alter_presence_read",
      "mcp__identity__describe_traits",
      "mcp__identity__describe_competencies",
      "mcp__identity__get_network_stats",
      "mcp__identity__recommend_tool",
      "mcp__identity__golden_thread_status",
      "mcp__identity__thread_census",
      "mcp__identity__alter_whoami",
      "mcp__identity__alter_login_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__identity__hello_agent",
      "mcp__identity__get_started",
      "mcp__identity__invite_to_alter",
      "mcp__identity__register_autonomous_challenge",
      "mcp__identity__alter_verify"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__identity__register_autonomous"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as identity. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__identity__invite_to_alter outbound
  • mcp__identity__describe_traits private-data
  • mcp__identity__golden_thread_status private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__identity__thread_census private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__identity__alter_whoami private-data
  • mcp__identity__alter_login_status private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.truealter/identity/verify?hash=58db92e76384227364ee51ddbd976a270a14d5b683db0edd7846e680a1949028" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 58db92e76384, from Nov 20, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.truealter/identity/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

~Alter MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ~Alter MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 17 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ~Alter MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: register_autonomous.

Can the ~Alter MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: invite_to_alter.

What tools does the ~Alter MCP server have?

17 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 11 read. register_autonomous, invite_to_alter, hello_agent, get_started, register_autonomous_challenge, alter_verify, list_archetypes, alter_resolve_handle and 9 more.

Does the ~Alter MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ~Alter MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): invite_to_alter.

Has the ~Alter MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.