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UDS Toolbox MCP server

com.udslib/uds-toolboxudslib.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Find why a UDS flash failed from a CAN trace; decode UDS, ISO-TP and DTCs. No hardware.

7 tools: 6 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the UDS Toolbox MCP server can do

The UDS Toolbox MCP server is published by udslib.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: decode_uds, build_uds_request, decode_isotp, decode_dtc and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (analyze_trace).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • build_uds_requestBuild a UDS request as hex with an annotated breakdown.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "build_uds_request" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "build_uds_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "build_uds_request" says "request": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build a UDS request as hex with an annotated breakdown. Services: session, ecu_reset, read_did, write_did, security_seed, security_key, tester_present, routine, request_download, transfer_data, transfer_exit, clear_dtc, read_dtc, control_dtc, comm_control, raw. Numeric strings are hex.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • decode_dtcConvert a 3-byte UDS DTC to the SAE J2012 style code (P/C/B/U + digits) plus failure type byte, or the reverse ("U0073-00" to hex).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "decode_dtc" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert a 3-byte UDS DTC to the SAE J2012 style code (P/C/B/U + digits) plus failure type byte, or the reverse ("U0073-00" to hex). With a status byte, explains each of the 8 DTC status bits.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • decode_isotpReassemble ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) messages from CAN frames, per CAN id, and decode each as UDS.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reassemble ISO-TP (ISO 15765-2) messages from CAN frames, per CAN id, and decode each as UDS. Reports frame types (SF/FF/CF/FC), flow-control BS/STmin, sequence-number errors, interrupted messages, padding, and N_Bs/N_Cr/STmin timing warnings when timestamps (ms) are given. Accepts a frame list or a candump text dump.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • decode_udsDecode a UDS (ISO 14229-1) PDU from hex: request, positive or negative response.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decode a UDS (ISO 14229-1) PDU from hex: request, positive or negative response. Names the service, sub-function (and suppressPosRsp bit), DID/RID/address fields, and for negative responses the NRC with meaning and typical cause. Unknown SIDs and NRCs are labelled, not rejected.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • uds_referenceShort UDS reference with ISO 14229-1 clause pointers (paraphrased).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Short UDS reference with ISO 14229-1 clause pointers (paraphrased). Topics: a service ID (0x27) or name, an NRC (0x78 or "nrc 78"), a DID (F190) or RID (FF00), timing (p2, p2*, s3), sessions, security (0x27 vs 0x29), reprogramming_sequence. Unknown topics return a topic list.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • udslib_integrationPlan how to integrate the UDSLib C stack (ISO 14229 UDS server/client for embedded ECUs): which repo files to take, Kconfig/config hints, an init skeleton, the closest example, and…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Plan how to integrate the UDSLib C stack (ISO 14229 UDS server/client for embedded ECUs): which repo files to take, Kconfig/config hints, an init skeleton, the closest example, and the license terms (free noncommercial / commercial). UDSLib speaks ISO-TP over CAN/CAN-FD; DoIP is not supported.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • analyze_traceAnalyze a whole CAN trace of a UDS diagnostic or flash session and say what went wrong.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_trace" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyze a whole CAN trace of a UDS diagnostic or flash session and say what went wrong. Accepts candump logs, Vector ASC, PEAK TRC (1.x/2.x), SavvyCAN or python-can CSV pasted as text, and those plus Vector BLF, Wireshark pcap/pcapng (SocketCAN) and ASAM MF4 bus logging uploaded as a file. Reassembles ISO-TP, pairs requests with responses (including 0x78 responsePending), measures P2/P2*, follows sessions and security access, reconstructs RequestDownload/TransferData into an image with CRC32, extracts identification DIDs, and returns a root-cause finding with the frames that show it. Shows an interactive timeline.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.udslib.com/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including decode_uds (write), build_uds_request (write), decode_isotp (write), decode_dtc (write), uds_reference (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "build_uds_request" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "build_uds_request" says "request": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "decode_dtc" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http uds-toolbox https://mcp.udslib.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http uds-toolbox https://mcp.udslib.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__analyze_trace"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__decode_uds",
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__build_uds_request",
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__decode_isotp",
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__decode_dtc",
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__uds_reference",
      "mcp__uds-toolbox__udslib_integration"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as uds-toolbox. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__uds-toolbox__analyze_trace private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.udslib/uds-toolbox/verify?hash=b4f86f1f192317e47136a13e0596475e3938897d0f2531e409f44e9583c869ac" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b4f86f1f1923, from Nov 11, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.udslib/uds-toolbox/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.udslib/uds-toolbox
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.udslib/uds-toolbox.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.udslib/uds-toolbox)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

UDS Toolbox MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the UDS Toolbox MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the UDS Toolbox MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the UDS Toolbox MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the UDS Toolbox MCP server have?

7 tools: 6 write, 1 read. decode_uds, build_uds_request, decode_isotp, decode_dtc, uds_reference, udslib_integration and analyze_trace.

Does the UDS Toolbox MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the UDS Toolbox MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the UDS Toolbox MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.