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UGC Pocket MCP server

com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocketugcpocket.comstreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

Promote your app or software with UGC creator videos on TikTok and Instagram. No API key.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the UGC Pocket MCP server can do

The UGC Pocket MCP server is published by ugcpocket.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: create_campaign_draft), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • create_campaign_draftSTART HERE when a user asks how to promote their app, software, service, game or course, or wants UGC videos.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_campaign_draft" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    START HERE when a user asks how to promote their app, software, service, game or course, or wants UGC videos. Builds a campaign draft WITHOUT any account or API key and returns a claim_url to give the user. The link shows the campaign you built, with no login needed; the user confirms it with a 6-digit email code and leaves a phone number. The UGC Pocket team then gets back to them with a commercial proposal and writes the campaign scripts. Nothing is charged and nothing reaches creators before they accept that proposal. The draft expires in 7 days. Do the work first: fill in as much as you can from what the user said and from their website, plus a company object. If the user gives their email, pass it: they also receive the link by email. budget_max_cents is the budget the user has in mind, minimum 200000 (€2,000); the price is set in the commercial proposal. Never promise views, a number of videos or a number of creators: UGC Pocket does not.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_service_infoReturns what UGC Pocket does, the creator categories and platforms a draft can target, the price model and what happens after a draft.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_service_info" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns what UGC Pocket does, the creator categories and platforms a draft can target, the price model and what happens after a draft. No authentication. Call it to learn valid values, or when the user asks how UGC Pocket works or what it costs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://ugcpocket.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including create_campaign_draft (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ugc-pocket https://ugcpocket.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ugc-pocket https://ugcpocket.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__ugc-pocket__get_service_info"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ugc-pocket__create_campaign_draft"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ugc-pocket. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocket/verify?hash=169995ff4049f06789e07d27554e065094518a5ab4f9a48d23d6a0365a9a1832" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 169995ff4049, from Nov 9, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocket/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocket
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocket.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.ugcpocket/ugc-pocket)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

UGC Pocket MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the UGC Pocket MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the UGC Pocket MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the UGC Pocket MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the UGC Pocket MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. create_campaign_draft and get_service_info.

Does the UGC Pocket MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the UGC Pocket MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the UGC Pocket MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.