Unprofane MCP server
com.unprofane/unprofaneunprofane.comstreamable-httpv0.1.5Scanned
Should I allow this text? Profanity and toxicity checks that are hard to fool, with the evidence.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Unprofane MCP server can do
The Unprofane MCP server is published by unprofane.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_text, check_batch and report_result), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.1.5.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_batchCheck up to 100 texts in one call, 30,000 characters in all, with the same settings.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check up to 100 texts in one call, 30,000 characters in all, with the same settings. Each item has your id and a text; results come back in order, each with its id and either a result (as check_text returns) or an error. Read-only; counts one check per item.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check many texts
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_textDecide whether one text should be allowed: profanity, slurs, insults, threats and sexual language, disguised spellings included (sh1t, f.u.c.k, leetspeak, homoglyphs).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Decide whether one text should be allowed: profanity, slurs, insults, threats and sexual language, disguised spellings included (sh1t, f.u.c.k, leetspeak, homoglyphs). Returns the action (allow, review, block), the matches with their categories and the tricks used, a one-sentence reason and a censored version. Read-only; counts one check against the plan. If the action is wrong, report it with report_result and the result's id.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a text
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
report_resultTell Unprofane a check got it wrong (or right): the result's id, the verdict and, if you know it, the action it should have taken.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Tell Unprofane a check got it wrong (or right): the result's id, the verdict and, if you know it, the action it should have taken. A person reads every report and corrections ship in a later engine. Writes a report; it changes no result and counts no check.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Report a wrong result
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_integration_snippetA complete, runnable recipe for adding Unprofane to a platform in a language: code to paste.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_integration_snippet" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A complete, runnable recipe for adding Unprofane to a platform in a language: code to paste. Use it when asked to add a profanity or username filter to an app. Read-only and free: it checks no text.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get an integration recipe
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_usageThe checks this key's account has used in the current billing period, how many its plan includes and any overage, with the share answered by the rules alone, the model or the cache…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_usage" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The checks this key's account has used in the current billing period, how many its plan includes and any overage, with the share answered by the rules alone, the model or the cache. Counts up to the last full hour. Read-only and free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get usage this period
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.unprofane.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_text (write), check_batch (write), report_result (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:check_batchChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:check_textChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http unprofane https://api.unprofane.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http unprofane https://api.unprofane.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__unprofane__get_usage",
"mcp__unprofane__get_integration_snippet"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__unprofane__check_text",
"mcp__unprofane__check_batch",
"mcp__unprofane__report_result"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as unprofane. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.unprofane/unprofane/verify?hash=af454b9d6c62f660def6b9d27ff3ea12a73c501ba24e5376ff8722c550018b1e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash af454b9d6c62, from Nov 9, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.unprofane/unprofane/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.unprofane/unprofane)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 24, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Unprofane MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Unprofane MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Unprofane MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Unprofane MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Unprofane MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. check_text, check_batch, report_result, get_usage and get_integration_snippet.
Does the Unprofane MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Unprofane MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Unprofane MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 24, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.