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Velrim MCP server

com.velrim/extractvelrim.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Document extraction against a JSON Schema with a calibrated confidence per field; async job status.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Velrim MCP server can do

The Velrim MCP server is published by velrim.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: velrim_extract), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (velrim_extract and velrim_job_status).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • velrim_extractExtract structured data from a document (PDF or image, passed as document_base64 or as the upload_key of a staged upload) against a JSON Schema you supply.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract structured data from a document (PDF or image, passed as document_base64 or as the upload_key of a staged upload) against a JSON Schema you supply. Returns a typed object and, for every field, a state (present, null, or missing), a calibrated confidence score, and an anchor (the source page and bounding box). The confidence is calibrated against published reliability curves (https://velrim.com/reliability), so a 0.9 means the field is right about 90% of the time on that document class — branch on it directly: act on a field at or above your accept threshold, escalate the fields below it and any that are missing. Use each field's anchor to check it against the source page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • velrim_job_statusPoll an asynchronous extraction job by its job_id (from POST /v1/jobs on the Velrim API; velrim_extract itself is synchronous and never creates jobs).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "velrim_job_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Poll an asynchronous extraction job by its job_id (from POST /v1/jobs on the Velrim API; velrim_extract itself is synchronous and never creates jobs). Returns the job status and, once complete, the same typed result as velrim_extract: per field a state (present, null, or missing), a calibrated confidence score, and an anchor (source page and bounding box). Confidence is calibrated against published reliability curves (https://velrim.com/reliability) — branch the same way: act on a field at or above your accept threshold, escalate the rest, and use each anchor to check a field against its source page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.velrim.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including velrim_extract (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http extract https://mcp.velrim.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http extract https://mcp.velrim.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__extract__velrim_job_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__extract__velrim_extract"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as extract. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__extract__velrim_extract untrusted-input
  • mcp__extract__velrim_job_status untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.velrim/extract/verify?hash=d6696f3c9bb24a52b5516b105e77b96b96304af4934203591a607ff5733719b0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d6696f3c9bb2, from Nov 14, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.velrim/extract/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.velrim/extract
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.velrim/extract.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.velrim/extract)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

Velrim MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Velrim MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Velrim MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Velrim MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Velrim MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. velrim_extract and velrim_job_status.

Does the Velrim MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Velrim MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Velrim MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.