Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server
com.vetosql/vetovetosql.comstreamable-httpv0.5.0Scanned
Deterministic safety, correctness & cost gate that vets Postgres SQL before your AI agent runs it.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server can do
The Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server is published by vetosql.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: analyze_sql and set_policies), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools read private data (analyze_sql and get_policies).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
analyze_sqlAnalyze Postgres SQL/migrations for destructive operations, locking risk, correctness traps (NULL handling that silently returns wrong results), anti-patterns, and query cost.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_sql" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.sql), which can change anything it can reach.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "analyze_sql" says "analyze" and "sql": it reads databases.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "analyze" and "sql": it reads databases.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze Postgres SQL/migrations for destructive operations, locking risk, correctness traps (NULL handling that silently returns wrong results), anti-patterns, and query cost. Returns a deterministic verdict (ok/warn/block) with findings. Pass the optional `schema` argument (your CREATE TABLE/INDEX DDL) to also get EXPLAIN-based cost analysis run on a throwaway scratch Postgres — no separate tool or DB connection needed.
set_policiesReplace the stored custom org policy set for your Pro key (this is also how you update or clear them: send the full new set to update, or an empty array to remove all).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "set_policies" says "set": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Replace the stored custom org policy set for your Pro key (this is also how you update or clear them: send the full new set to update, or an empty array to remove all). Each policy blocks or warns on an operation against matching tables (e.g. no DELETE on payments). Policies are declarative data — validated, never executed — and apply transparently to every later analyze_sql call made with this key. Use get_policies to read the current set.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_policiesReturn the custom org policy set currently stored for your Pro key — the same rules analyze_sql enforces on top of the built-ins.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_policies" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "sql": it reads databases.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the custom org policy set currently stored for your Pro key — the same rules analyze_sql enforces on top of the built-ins. Read-only; returns an empty list if none are set. Use set_policies to change them.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:49 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://vetosql.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including analyze_sql (write), set_policies (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http veto https://vetosql.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http veto https://vetosql.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__veto__get_policies"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__veto__analyze_sql",
"mcp__veto__set_policies"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as veto. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__veto__analyze_sql private-data
- mcp__veto__get_policies private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.vetosql/veto/verify?hash=d5d32316fe189518a39d46ee7b6fa2feedf8ec76d361c041e7b28b8b67602c3e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d5d32316fe18, from Nov 11, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.vetosql/veto/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.vetosql/veto)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.
Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. analyze_sql, set_policies and get_policies.
Does the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Veto — SQL Safety & Cost Oracle MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.