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VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server

com.volt48/agent-doorvolt48.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

48V DC telecom power: rectifier modules, controllers, LiFePO4 batteries by part number. No prices.

4 tools: 1 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server can do

The VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server is published by volt48.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: request_quote), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_terms); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (request_quote); 1 tool can send data out of your system (request_quote). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • request_quoteRecord a sourcing requirement with VOLT48 on behalf of a buyer (telecom operator, ISP, integrator, data-centre team): part numbers or descriptions with quantities.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_quote" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.buyer.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Record a sourcing requirement with VOLT48 on behalf of a buyer (telecom operator, ISP, integrator, data-centre team): part numbers or descriptions with quantities. VOLT48 is selecting its manufacturing partners; the request is recorded and quoted once a supplying factory is confirmed. Nothing is binding and nothing is sent automatically. Only call with the buyer's consent to share their contact details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_familyFull detail of one product family by id (from search_parts): lifecycle status, models and part numbers, applications, what to send for a quotation, honest alternatives, page.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_family" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full detail of one product family by id (from search_parts): lifecycle status, models and part numbers, applications, what to send for a quotation, honest alternatives, page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_termsWhere VOLT48 stands today (selecting manufacturing partners, no orders yet), condition policy, markets, compliance and contacts.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_terms" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "contact": it reads contacts.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Where VOLT48 stands today (selecting manufacturing partners, no orders yet), condition policy, markets, compliance and contacts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_partsSearch VOLT48's catalogue of 48V DC telecom power equipment — rectifier modules (Eltek Flatpack2/Flatpack S, Huawei R4850G2, Vertiv/Emerson NetSure, Delta ESR, Eaton APR48, ZTE ZXD…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_parts" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search VOLT48's catalogue of 48V DC telecom power equipment — rectifier modules (Eltek Flatpack2/Flatpack S, Huawei R4850G2, Vertiv/Emerson NetSure, Delta ESR, Eaton APR48, ZTE ZXDU), plant controllers and 48V LiFePO4 batteries — by part number, brand or model. Returns lifecycle status, models and part numbers. No prices or lead times.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-door__request_quote"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
429
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 429.

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-door https://volt48.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-door https://volt48.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-door__search_parts",
      "mcp__agent-door__get_family",
      "mcp__agent-door__get_terms"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-door__request_quote"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-door. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__agent-door__get_terms private-data
  • mcp__agent-door__request_quote untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.volt48/agent-door/verify?hash=4d758c807890dcbb0cf4ec862bd328b7bb0d80de63cc430028c5856f73931b77" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4d758c807890, from Nov 21, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.volt48/agent-door/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.volt48/agent-door
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.volt48/agent-door.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.volt48/agent-door)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 write, 3 read. request_quote, search_parts, get_family and get_terms.

Does the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): request_quote.

Has the VOLT48 — 48V DC telecom power MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.