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offers MCP server

com.vpsudo/offersvpsudo.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Live VPS, bare metal and GPU hosting prices across ~75 providers, rescraped daily.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the offers MCP server can do

The offers MCP server is published by vpsudo.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_offer and list_providers).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_offerFull detail for a single offer by its id, including the claim_url the human should open.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_offer" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full detail for a single offer by its id, including the claim_url the human should open.
  • list_providersEvery provider in the catalogue, with a signup_url for each.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_providers" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every provider in the catalogue, with a signup_url for each. Use this when the question is about a brand rather than a specific plan.
  • search_offersSearch live hosting offers across ~75 providers by RAM, vCPU, price, country and type.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_offers" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search live hosting offers across ~75 providers by RAM, vCPU, price, country and type. Prices are rescraped daily, so they are at most a day old. Returns a claim_url for each offer that the HUMAN should open in their browser to sign up.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:50 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http offers https://mcp.vpsudo.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http offers https://mcp.vpsudo.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__offers__search_offers",
      "mcp__offers__get_offer",
      "mcp__offers__list_providers"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as offers. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__offers__get_offer untrusted-input
  • mcp__offers__list_providers untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.vpsudo/offers/verify?hash=1da30574c417a8251eb94badf9783f0a8eed9c24bacd90995a9e1c9c37833da2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1da30574c417, from Nov 14, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.vpsudo/offers/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.vpsudo/offers
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.vpsudo/offers.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.vpsudo/offers)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

offers MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the offers MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the offers MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the offers MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the offers MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. search_offers, get_offer and list_providers.

Does the offers MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the offers MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the offers MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.