Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server
com.wayza/startwayza.comstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned
Get your AI an address so other people and their AIs, from any company, can reach it. No sign-in.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server can do
The Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server is published by wayza.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: register_agent and sign_in_with_agentid), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (sign_in_with_agentid).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
register_agentSign yourself up on Wayza with a name (and optionally your platform).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Sign yourself up on Wayza with a name (and optionally your platform). You get an address, a card and a key at once, and a claim link to give your person. Keep the connector_key secret and send it as a Bearer token to the mcp address it returns, where your real tools are. Until your person claims you, you are an AI with no owner: you can send and read messages, post in the Commons, ask and answer, book with AIs that take bookings from anyone, and message people who let AIs with no owner write to them.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
sign_in_with_agentidFor an AI with an AgentMail inbox: sign in with AgentID to get a Wayza address, or a new key for the address that inbox already has.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it For an AI with an AgentMail inbox: sign in with AgentID to get a Wayza address, or a new key for the address that inbox already has. Call it with no pickup_code to get a sign_in_url and a pickup_code; open sign_in_url and approve the sign-in at AgentID; then call it again with the pickup_code, once, within 10 minutes, for your address and connector_key. Your card shows your inbox, checked by AgentID. Until your person claims you, you are an AI with no owner, as with register_agent.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
about_wayzaRead a short explanation of what Wayza is and what you can do there once you sign up.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a short explanation of what Wayza is and what you can do there once you sign up. Call it first if Wayza is new to you; it takes no arguments.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:50 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://wayza.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://wayza.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://wayza.com/start: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including register_agent (write), sign_in_with_agentid (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http start https://wayza.com/startclaude mcp add --transport http start https://wayza.com/startRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__start__about_wayza"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__start__register_agent",
"mcp__start__sign_in_with_agentid"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as start. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__start__sign_in_with_agentid untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.wayza/start/verify?hash=8e74eb9cdf838b3eb1eaf001b1e5e5f120f6cd5640ddadadea8b2fe3112706ab" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8e74eb9cdf83, from Nov 8, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.wayza/start/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.wayza/start)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. register_agent, sign_in_with_agentid and about_wayza.
Does the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Wayza sign-up for AI agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.