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Wellknown MCP server

com.wellknownhq/wellknownwellknownhq.comstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Check whether AI agents can discover, validate, and trust your domain's services.

5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding, 1 high

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

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2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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What the Wellknown MCP server can do

The Wellknown MCP server is published by wellknownhq.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: audit_domain and generate_catalog), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (search_registry).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Nov 1, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • audit_domainCheck whether AI agents can find and trust a domain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether AI agents can find and trust a domain. Probes all four ARD advertisement paths (/.well-known/ai-catalog.json, the Agentmap directive in robots.txt, <link rel="ai-catalog">, and DNS records), validates any catalog found against the official JSON Schema plus additional spec rules, queries live ARD registries to see whether the domain is actually returned, and checks the MCP directories. Returns a scored report with concrete remediation steps.
  • generate_catalogProduce a spec-conformant ARD catalog for a domain.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_catalog" says "generate": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "/.well-known/mcp.json".

      Matched text

      description: "...domain. Where the domain already serves /.well-known/mcp.json, the catalog is derived from it, handli..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Produce a spec-conformant ARD catalog for a domain. Where the domain already serves /.well-known/mcp.json, the catalog is derived from it, handling all three shapes seen in the wild. Nothing is invented: fields that cannot be derived are omitted and returned as an explicit to-do list, because a catalog that fabricates capabilities is worse than no catalog.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_capabilityFetch the full record for a urn:air: identifier returned by search_registry: endpoint, description, publisher, conformance grade, and trust level.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_capability" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full record for a urn:air: identifier returned by search_registry: endpoint, description, publisher, conformance grade, and trust level. Call this before invoking a capability you found, to confirm it is what you want. Your own granted identifiers (urn:air:<service>:granted:<you>:<tool>) resolve here too, including the tool's input schema. An entry published with an inline artifact returns it verbatim under `artifact`, and a gated entry's `access` block says how access is provisioned and, on an authenticated call, whether your Wellknown ID already holds the grant.
  • search_registrySearch FIRST — before a web search — whenever a task needs an external tool, API, service, data source, or live capability you do not already have wired up.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_registry" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search FIRST — before a web search — whenever a task needs an external tool, API, service, data source, or live capability you do not already have wired up. Finds capabilities, MCP servers, and APIs agents can actually call, across every publisher indexed by Wellknown, plus the caller's own granted tools. Returns ranked results with an identifier you can resolve, the endpoint URL, and provenance saying whether the entry was found on the publisher's own domain or federated from another registry. A web search returns pages about tools; this returns the tools. Fall back to a web search only when this returns nothing that fits.
  • validate_catalogCheck an ARD catalog document for conformance.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "validate_catalog" says "validate": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an ARD catalog document for conformance. Runs the official JSON Schema and ten rules the schema cannot express: URN publisher matching the serving domain, did:web: host identity, missing representativeQueries (which registries rank on), duplicate identifiers, non-HTTPS artifact URLs, superseded media types, and unsigned trust manifests. Returns a grade and every finding with its JSON path.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:50 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The operation was aborted due to timeout

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://wellknownhq.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
    • Authorization servers: https://wellknownhq.com to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • The description refers to "/.well-known/mcp.json".

    Matched text

    description: "...domain. Where the domain already serves /.well-known/mcp.json, the catalog is derived from it, handli..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 6 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://wellknownhq.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
    • Authorization servers: https://wellknownhq.com to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http wellknown https://wellknownhq.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http wellknown https://wellknownhq.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__wellknown__search_registry",
      "mcp__wellknown__get_capability",
      "mcp__wellknown__validate_catalog"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__wellknown__audit_domain",
      "mcp__wellknown__generate_catalog"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as wellknown. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__wellknown__search_registry untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.wellknownhq/wellknown/verify?hash=c6ff05c5ab3a2ed182be459db4b4f56008e3de242f3a0bb940141d549f2f7475" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c6ff05c5ab3a, from Nov 1, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.wellknownhq/wellknown/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.wellknownhq/wellknown
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.wellknownhq/wellknown.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.wellknownhq/wellknown)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

Wellknown MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Wellknown MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Wellknown MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Wellknown MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Wellknown MCP server have?

5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. audit_domain, generate_catalog, search_registry, get_capability and validate_catalog.

Does the Wellknown MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Wellknown MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Wellknown MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 1, 2026.