Wever World Data MCP server
com.weverpay/world-dataweverpay.comstreamable-httpv0.10.1Scanned
Discover Wever services, process data, and delegate checked results between agents.
10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Wever World Data MCP server can do
The Wever World Data MCP server is published by weverpay.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: delete_job and revoke_result_reference) and create or change data (3 tools: create_result_reference, submit_audit and submit_csv). 5 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_catalog).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.10.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
delete_jobDelete the owner's stored result content.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_job" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete the owner's stored result content. Retains an idempotency tombstone until expiry and does not reset quotas. Configure the owner's bearer access header.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
revoke_result_referenceOwner revokes future retrieval through one shared result reference.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "revoke_result_reference" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Owner revokes future retrieval through one shared result reference. Repeating this action is safe; previously downloaded copies cannot be recalled.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
create_result_referenceAuthorize one recipient client_id to read one owned result with its own credential.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_result_reference" says "create": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...d to read one owned result with its own credential. Returns a credential-free, expiring re..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.ttl_seconds.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.ttl_seconds.description: "...also bounded by the job and both access credentials' expiry."
Description, as the server wrote it Authorize one recipient client_id to read one owned result with its own credential. Returns a credential-free, expiring reference for agent handoff. Owner access stays in the configured header. Requires explicit intended recipient; no permission to other jobs, deletion or resharing.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
submit_auditAudit bounded CSV against caller-supplied expected records with explicit grouping, exact source references, lineage and integrity checks.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_audit" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Audit bounded CSV against caller-supplied expected records with explicit grouping, exact source references, lineage and integrity checks. A completed audit can report mismatches or blocked parsing. Inspect result.status, comparison, ambiguities and unsupported rules. No factual verification or inferred transformations.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
submit_csvNormalize bounded CSV using explicit column rules.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_csv" says "submit": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Normalize bounded CSV using explicit column rules. Returns a complete private job and checked CSV. Configure bearer access in the client header. Reuse request_key on retries.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_catalogRead public capabilities, free allowances, access bootstrap, privacy, retention and HTTP discovery routes.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_catalog" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...on and HTTP discovery routes. No access credential required."
Description, as the server wrote it Read public capabilities, free allowances, access bootstrap, privacy, retention and HTTP discovery routes. No access credential required.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
get_jobRecover the original complete private CSV or audit result using its job_id and the owner's bearer access header.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Recover the original complete private CSV or audit result using its job_id and the owner's bearer access header. Results expire within 24 hours and cannot outlive access.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
get_result_referenceRetrieve the full shared result using the nominated recipient's configured bearer header.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_result_reference" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the full shared result using the nominated recipient's configured bearer header. The reference alone grants no access. Expired, revoked or deleted results are unavailable.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
resolve_capabilityResolve an exact canonical Wever service_id to its maintained connection metadata, contract, limits and access steps.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "resolve_capability" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.service_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.service_id.description: "...at most 96 UTF-8 bytes. Never a URL or credential."
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve an exact canonical Wever service_id to its maintained connection metadata, contract, limits and access steps. Unknown identities are rejected; no caller-supplied URL is fetched. Does not verify live availability or authorize execution.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
search_capabilitiesFind maintained Wever capabilities by a short task description or keyword.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_capabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find maintained Wever capabilities by a short task description or keyword. Returns fixed known services with connection details, contracts, limits and access steps. Does not execute work, grant permissions, search the whole web, or verify live availability.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-11-25
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (2 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_job (destructive), revoke_result_reference (destructive), create_result_reference (write), submit_audit (write), submit_csv (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...d to read one owned result with its own credential. Returns a credential-free, expiring re..."
The input schema at properties.ttl_seconds.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.ttl_seconds.description: "...also bounded by the job and both access credentials' expiry."
- Infoget_catalog
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...on and HTTP discovery routes. No access credential required."
The input schema at properties.service_id.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.service_id.description: "...at most 96 UTF-8 bytes. Never a URL or credential."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.10.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http world-data https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http world-data https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__world-data__get_catalog",
"mcp__world-data__get_job",
"mcp__world-data__get_result_reference",
"mcp__world-data__resolve_capability",
"mcp__world-data__search_capabilities"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__world-data__create_result_reference",
"mcp__world-data__submit_audit",
"mcp__world-data__submit_csv"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__world-data__delete_job",
"mcp__world-data__revoke_result_reference"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as world-data. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__world-data__get_catalog untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.weverpay/world-data/verify?hash=e1bfe58fd95940e34c136cec68989f8af26c0a7d674d228b58f20deb5e52ffab" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e1bfe58fd959, from Nov 17, 2026, 04:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.weverpay/world-data/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.weverpay/world-data)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.
Wever World Data MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Wever World Data MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Wever World Data MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_job and revoke_result_reference.
Can the Wever World Data MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Wever World Data MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 2 destructive, 3 write, 5 read. delete_job, revoke_result_reference, create_result_reference, submit_audit, submit_csv, get_catalog, get_job, get_result_reference and 2 more.
Does the Wever World Data MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Wever World Data MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Wever World Data MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.