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Wever World Data MCP server

com.weverpay/world-dataweverpay.comstreamable-httpv0.10.1Scanned

Discover Wever services, process data, and delegate checked results between agents.

10 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Wever World Data MCP server can do

The Wever World Data MCP server is published by weverpay.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: delete_job and revoke_result_reference) and create or change data (3 tools: create_result_reference, submit_audit and submit_csv). 5 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_catalog).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.10.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • delete_jobDelete the owner's stored result content.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_job" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete the owner's stored result content. Retains an idempotency tombstone until expiry and does not reset quotas. Configure the owner's bearer access header.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • revoke_result_referenceOwner revokes future retrieval through one shared result reference.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "revoke_result_reference" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Owner revokes future retrieval through one shared result reference. Repeating this action is safe; previously downloaded copies cannot be recalled.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_result_referenceAuthorize one recipient client_id to read one owned result with its own credential.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_result_reference" says "create": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...d to read one owned result with its own credential. Returns a credential-free, expiring re..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.ttl_seconds.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.ttl_seconds.description: "...also bounded by the job and both access credentials' expiry."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Authorize one recipient client_id to read one owned result with its own credential. Returns a credential-free, expiring reference for agent handoff. Owner access stays in the configured header. Requires explicit intended recipient; no permission to other jobs, deletion or resharing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • submit_auditAudit bounded CSV against caller-supplied expected records with explicit grouping, exact source references, lineage and integrity checks.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_audit" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit bounded CSV against caller-supplied expected records with explicit grouping, exact source references, lineage and integrity checks. A completed audit can report mismatches or blocked parsing. Inspect result.status, comparison, ambiguities and unsupported rules. No factual verification or inferred transformations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • submit_csvNormalize bounded CSV using explicit column rules.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_csv" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Normalize bounded CSV using explicit column rules. Returns a complete private job and checked CSV. Configure bearer access in the client header. Reuse request_key on retries.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_catalogRead public capabilities, free allowances, access bootstrap, privacy, retention and HTTP discovery routes.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_catalog" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...on and HTTP discovery routes. No access credential required."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read public capabilities, free allowances, access bootstrap, privacy, retention and HTTP discovery routes. No access credential required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_jobRecover the original complete private CSV or audit result using its job_id and the owner's bearer access header.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recover the original complete private CSV or audit result using its job_id and the owner's bearer access header. Results expire within 24 hours and cannot outlive access.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • get_result_referenceRetrieve the full shared result using the nominated recipient's configured bearer header.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_result_reference" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the full shared result using the nominated recipient's configured bearer header. The reference alone grants no access. Expired, revoked or deleted results are unavailable.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • resolve_capabilityResolve an exact canonical Wever service_id to its maintained connection metadata, contract, limits and access steps.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_capability" says "resolve": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.service_id.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.service_id.description: "...at most 96 UTF-8 bytes. Never a URL or credential."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an exact canonical Wever service_id to its maintained connection metadata, contract, limits and access steps. Unknown identities are rejected; no caller-supplied URL is fetched. Does not verify live availability or authorize execution.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • search_capabilitiesFind maintained Wever capabilities by a short task description or keyword.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_capabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find maintained Wever capabilities by a short task description or keyword. Returns fixed known services with connection details, contracts, limits and access steps. Does not execute work, grant permissions, search the whole web, or verify live availability.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-11-25
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (2 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_job (destructive), revoke_result_reference (destructive), create_result_reference (write), submit_audit (write), submit_csv (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

4 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.10.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http world-data https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http world-data https://wever-world-data.quiet-salad-e96e.workers.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__world-data__get_catalog",
      "mcp__world-data__get_job",
      "mcp__world-data__get_result_reference",
      "mcp__world-data__resolve_capability",
      "mcp__world-data__search_capabilities"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__world-data__create_result_reference",
      "mcp__world-data__submit_audit",
      "mcp__world-data__submit_csv"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__world-data__delete_job",
      "mcp__world-data__revoke_result_reference"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as world-data. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__world-data__get_catalog untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.weverpay/world-data/verify?hash=e1bfe58fd95940e34c136cec68989f8af26c0a7d674d228b58f20deb5e52ffab" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e1bfe58fd959, from Nov 17, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.weverpay/world-data/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.weverpay/world-data
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.weverpay/world-data.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.weverpay/world-data)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:10 UTC.

Wever World Data MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Wever World Data MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Wever World Data MCP server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_job and revoke_result_reference.

Can the Wever World Data MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Wever World Data MCP server have?

10 tools: 2 destructive, 3 write, 5 read. delete_job, revoke_result_reference, create_result_reference, submit_audit, submit_csv, get_catalog, get_job, get_result_reference and 2 more.

Does the Wever World Data MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Wever World Data MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Wever World Data MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.