AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server
com.x402-agent-pay/facilitatorx402-agent-pay.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Verify signed x402 payments; treasury-scoped settlement is irreversible.
2 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 6 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server can do
The AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server is published by x402-agent-pay.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: x402_facilitator_settle) and create or change data (1 tool: x402_facilitator_verify). None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (x402_facilitator_verify and x402_facilitator_settle).
The fixed checks matched 6 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
x402_facilitator_settleIRREVERSIBLE SIDE EFFECT: forwards the envelope to POST https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/settle.Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- The description says "IRREVERSIBLE".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...AgentPay treasury (0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 on Base / 6aCEuwH3P..."
- Warn
The description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Bf3451a03 on Base / 6aCEuwH3PYx99cEmRz45otfxk39uF7ewGhqmvxfXisSG on Solana), then br..."
- Warn
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
Description, as the server wrote it IRREVERSIBLE SIDE EFFECT: forwards the envelope to POST https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/settle. The existing facilitator first re-runs verify(), then refuses PAYEE_NOT_SERVED_HERE unless payTo is the AgentPay treasury (0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 on Base / 6aCEuwH3PYx99cEmRz45otfxk39uF7ewGhqmvxfXisSG on Solana), then broadcasts via Coinbase CDP and returns a transaction hash. Malformed, unsigned, out-of-scope, or unverified payloads are rejected before any external transfer. This adapter never signs, never holds keys, and never bypasses those gates. Do not call this as a dry run.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Settle x402 payment (irreversible)
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
x402_facilitator_verifyForward an x402 payment envelope to POST https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/verify.Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
- Warn
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3PYx99cEmRz45otfxk39uF7ewGhqmvxfXisSG (Solana)."
- Warn
The input schema at properties.body.properties.payment_requirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.payment_requirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
Description, as the server wrote it Forward an x402 payment envelope to POST https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/verify. Recovers the EIP-712 signer, checks payee/amount/expiry/nonce/USDC balance and spend authority. Free. No gas. No broadcast. Returns isValid plus invalidReason when the payload cannot clear. Authorization still lives in the existing facilitator implementation; this tool only forwards the JSON body.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Verify x402 payment
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:50 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including x402_facilitator_settle (destructive), x402_facilitator_verify (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3PYx99cEmRz45otfxk39uF7ewGhqmvxfXisSG (Solana)."
The input schema at properties.body.properties.payment_requirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.payment_requirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
The description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...AgentPay treasury (0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 on Base / 6aCEuwH3P..."
The description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Bf3451a03 on Base / 6aCEuwH3PYx99cEmRz45otfxk39uF7ewGhqmvxfXisSG on Solana), then br..."
The input schema at properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.body.properties.paymentRequirements.anyOf[0].properties.payTo.description: "...e AgentPay treasury 0x367F1b3D8Ca90D1e087481a9A40d585Bf3451a03 (Base) or 6aCEuwH3P..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http facilitator https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http facilitator https://x402-agent-pay.com/facilitator/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__facilitator__x402_facilitator_verify"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__facilitator__x402_facilitator_settle"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as facilitator. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__facilitator__x402_facilitator_verify untrusted-input
- mcp__facilitator__x402_facilitator_settle untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.x402-agent-pay/facilitator/verify?hash=e8c1aba9c3424f5df4e7e44ea545a7e51899933bf57c4e6e26db83afe3dd2ad7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e8c1aba9c342, from Nov 14, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.x402-agent-pay/facilitator/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.x402-agent-pay/facilitator)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.
AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: x402_facilitator_settle.
Can the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write. x402_facilitator_settle and x402_facilitator_verify.
Does the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentPay x402 Facilitator MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.