Xevol Store MCP server
com.xevol/storexevol.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Search Xevol's store of ready-made AI jobs, products and services. No account needed.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Xevol Store MCP server can do
The Xevol Store MCP server is published by xevol.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_store_itemOne store item by its publisher name and slug (both from search_store): what it does, what it needs, what an install would touch, its settings and its link.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_store_item" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it One store item by its publisher name and slug (both from search_store): what it does, what it needs, what an install would touch, its settings and its link. It says nothing about any Workspace; what a Workspace still needs before an install is on the signed-in server, https://xevol.com/api/mcp. Free and read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Store Item
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
search_storeFind what Xevol's store offers, the same listings xevol.com shows: ready-made jobs, products, services and screens from Xevol and other publishers.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_store" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find what Xevol's store offers, the same listings xevol.com shows: ready-made jobs, products, services and screens from Xevol and other publishers. Pass optional words (q; every word must appear in the card), app, kind or goodFor (a kind of customer), or nothing for the whole store, and match it to the business yourself. Each card has its address and `action`: the link a person opens to install, set up or ask about it, or null when it is not open yet. Free and read-only; it installs nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search Store
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http store https://xevol.com/api/mcp/storeclaude mcp add --transport http store https://xevol.com/api/mcp/storeRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__store__search_store",
"mcp__store__get_store_item"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as store. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.xevol/store/verify?hash=89d3956637d05a2551cecafc0264ab7c08f613ec017af0ac638e5263b3b671fe" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 89d3956637d0, from Nov 9, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.xevol/store/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.xevol/store)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Xevol Store MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Xevol Store MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Xevol Store MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Xevol Store MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Xevol Store MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. search_store and get_store_item.
Does the Xevol Store MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Xevol Store MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Xevol Store MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.