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Zaps MCP server

design.zaps/zapszaps.designstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Photos and a brief in, finished social-media designs out. First design free, no account.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Zaps MCP server can do

The Zaps MCP server is published by zaps.design, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: upload_images, create_designs and fill_template), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (create_designs and fill_template).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_designsThe whole job in one call: give it a SEARCH QUERY you have written, your photo URLs and the words you want on the design, and it finds templates that fit, renders each with your ph…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_designs" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The whole job in one call: give it a SEARCH QUERY you have written, your photo URLs and the words you want on the design, and it finds templates that fit, renders each with your photos and your copy, and returns several finished designs to choose between. Use this when someone wants options — it is search and render together, so there is no need to call search_templates and fill_template yourself. Templates that hold every photo you supplied are preferred, so pass all of them. Photos attached in the conversation go in `photos`; photos already on the web go in `images`. Each returned design spends one agentic token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • fill_templateRender a finished image: give it a template id from search_templates and the photo URLs to place, and it returns the rendered design.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fill_template" says "fill": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Render a finished image: give it a template id from search_templates and the photo URLs to place, and it returns the rendered design. Photos are placed into the template's image slots in the order given, so pass them in the order you want them to appear. Photos attached in the conversation go in `photos`; photos already on the web go in `images`. Each render spends one agentic token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • upload_imagesCall this FIRST when the photos are on the caller's machine rather than already on the web — our renderer fetches over the network and cannot read a local path.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "upload_images" says "upload": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call this FIRST when the photos are on the caller's machine rather than already on the web — our renderer fetches over the network and cannot read a local path. Simplest way: read each file and pass it in `files` as base64; the reply gives you a publicUrl per photo to hand straight to create_designs, with nothing else to run. If you would rather upload the bytes yourself, pass `count` instead and you get presigned links to PUT to. Costs nothing either way.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • search_templatesFind design templates.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_templates" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find design templates. YOU write the query, and its wording decides the match: the catalogue describes each template as Title Case phrases separated by commas, and a query in that same register scores about 0.11 higher than the same intent written as a sentence. Write five or six phrases covering the occasion, the subject and the mood — "Coffee Shop, Cafe Vibes, Grand Opening, Latte Art, Cafe Aesthetic" rather than "grand opening of a neighbourhood coffee shop". A single word is worst of all. Returns templates with an id to fill and a link a person can open to keep editing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:51 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.zaps.design/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://api.zaps.design
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.zaps.design/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including upload_images (write), create_designs (write), fill_template (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http zaps https://api.zaps.design/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http zaps https://api.zaps.design/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__zaps__search_templates"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__zaps__upload_images",
      "mcp__zaps__create_designs",
      "mcp__zaps__fill_template"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as zaps. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__zaps__create_designs untrusted-input
  • mcp__zaps__fill_template untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/design.zaps/zaps/verify?hash=950e3928ab1eee9482ec76b92383c40350aa401fa70b65b4f1fb66ab1dfa9587" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 950e3928ab1e, from Nov 11, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/design.zaps/zaps/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for design.zaps/zaps
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/design.zaps/zaps.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/design.zaps/zaps)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

Zaps MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Zaps MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Zaps MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Zaps MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Zaps MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. upload_images, create_designs, fill_template and search_templates.

Does the Zaps MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Zaps MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Zaps MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 29, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.