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AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server

dev.agentdiet/github-auditagentdiet.devstreamable-httpv7.0.17Scanned

Evaluates any GitHub repository for license risk, maintenance velocity, stars/forks, and supply-c.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

Anlyon alternative

Everything your agent needs in GitHub. None of the key.

Anlyon has its own GitHub integration. Every write runs under a limit you set and comes back with a receipt read from the provider.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

See the GitHub integration →

What the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server can do

The AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server is published by agentdiet.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: audit_github_repository), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (audit_github_repository).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 7.0.17.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • audit_github_repositoryEvaluates any GitHub repository for license risk, maintenance velocity, stars/forks, and supply-chain security before code execution.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "audit_github_repository" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Evaluates any GitHub repository for license risk, maintenance velocity, stars/forks, and supply-chain security before code execution. WHEN TO USE: Call `audit_github_repository` when your task requires deterministic `github-audit` analysis for `repo`; use `get_agent_wallet_status` to check your remaining free trial quota or prepaid balance. WHEN NOT TO USE: Do not use for unrelated domains or binary media. PARAMETER INTERACTIONS: Pass the target `repo` as a non-empty string; omit `agent_id` and `tx_hash` during your 5 free trial calls, or supply `agent_id` (`agd_pass_...`) / `tx_hash` for paid execution. Read-only and idempotent; results are cached for 1 hour (<5ms cache hit). $0.01 per call. Pricing: the first 5 calls per agent_id are free and failed calls are never charged. After 5 calls, the tool returns a payment-required quote (not a fatal error) with a $2 Stripe top-up link and Base/Solana USDC addresses; complete payment, then retry with your agd_pass_ key in agent_id or pass tx_hash. Example: audit_github_repository(repo='example')

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit github repository
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_agent_wallet_statusInspect an agent's account ledger: remaining free trial calls (out of 5), prepaid USD balance, cumulative spend, total API calls, and total LLM tokens saved.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_wallet_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect an agent's account ledger: remaining free trial calls (out of 5), prepaid USD balance, cumulative spend, total API calls, and total LLM tokens saved. WHEN TO USE: Call before a batch of paid tool executions or after completing a Stripe or USDC top-up to confirm your balance. WHEN NOT TO USE: Do not use to process web content, execute marketplace tools, or submit payments; use the other tools on this server for execution. PARAMETER INTERACTIONS: Omit agent_id to inspect the default trial account derived from your client IP, or pass your explicit agent_id or agd_pass_ session key to check a specific funded wallet. Free and read-only: never charges a fee or consumes a free trial call. Example: get_agent_wallet_status(agent_id='example')

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get agent wallet status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://github-audit.agentdiet.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://github-audit.agentdiet.dev
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://github-audit.agentdiet.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_github_repository (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "audit_github_repository" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 7.0.17. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http github-audit https://github-audit.agentdiet.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http github-audit https://github-audit.agentdiet.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__github-audit__get_agent_wallet_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__github-audit__audit_github_repository"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as github-audit. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__github-audit__audit_github_repository untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.agentdiet/github-audit/verify?hash=c81eccacca729fce415e933922e648b8b87dc57a61766a483c417154b3d1de50" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c81eccacca72, from Nov 10, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agentdiet/github-audit/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.agentdiet/github-audit
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.agentdiet/github-audit.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agentdiet/github-audit)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. audit_github_repository and get_agent_wallet_status.

Does the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AgentDiet Coding Agent GitHub Repo, Dependency & License Security Auditor MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.