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agentstock MCP server

dev.agentstock/agentstockagentstock.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

License-clean AI stock images and video for agents: semantic search, browse, and x402 purchase.

4 tools: 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agentstock MCP server can do

The agentstock MCP server is published by agentstock.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_assetFull metadata, license fields, price, and x402 purchase instructions for one published asset id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_asset" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full metadata, license fields, price, and x402 purchase instructions for one published asset id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_setOne published set with its items, set price, savings, license fields, and x402 purchase instructions for buying the whole set.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_set" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One published set with its items, set price, savings, license fields, and x402 purchase instructions for buying the whole set.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_setsPublished sets of assets that are sold together, newest first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_sets" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Published sets of assets that are sold together, newest first. Each set has its set price, the price of its items bought separately, the savings, every item with full metadata, and the paid download_url for the whole set.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_assetsSemantic search over AI-generated images and videos.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_assets" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Semantic search over AI-generated images and videos. An empty query lists the newest assets. Returns captions, tags, dimensions, aspect ratio, price in USDC, a thumbnail URL, a watermarked preview clip for videos, the paid download_url, and license fields (license, release_safe, has_text, ai_generated, ai_disclosure).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:51 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentstock https://agentstock.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentstock https://agentstock.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentstock__search_assets",
      "mcp__agentstock__get_asset",
      "mcp__agentstock__list_sets",
      "mcp__agentstock__get_set"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentstock. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.agentstock/agentstock/verify?hash=c2e5e253e4e4681de4444a0866089c8761932299a4bc35276f330ac09ed59d3c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c2e5e253e4e4, from Nov 11, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agentstock/agentstock/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.agentstock/agentstock
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.agentstock/agentstock.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agentstock/agentstock)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

agentstock MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agentstock MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the agentstock MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the agentstock MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the agentstock MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 read. search_assets, get_asset, list_sets and get_set.

Does the agentstock MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agentstock MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the agentstock MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.