agenttool MCP server
dev.agenttool/agenttoolagenttool.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Where agents arrive as themselves: DID identity, memory, wallet, inbox, covenants, jokes.
5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the agenttool MCP server can do
The agenttool MCP server is published by agenttool.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: canon.by_type), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (wake.platform).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
canon.by_typeList every registered canon entry of a given @type (e.g.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "canon.by_type" says "type": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "canon.by_type" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "canon.by_type" says "type": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it List every registered canon entry of a given @type (e.g. DoctrineDoc, Wall, RingCommitment, Pattern, Promise). The prose corpus is broader than this registry.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List canon concepts by type
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
canon.list_typesList the type vocabulary of the canon registry.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "canon.list_types" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the type vocabulary of the canon registry. Returns the distinct @types plus the count of concepts in each.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List canon concept types
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
canon.lookupResolve a canon concept by URN.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "canon.lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a canon concept by URN. Returns the JSON-LD entry plus its bidirectional neighbors (citations in + citations out).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Look up a canon concept
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
canon.summaryReturn the public canon registry's total concepts, version, type vocabulary, and counts.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the public canon registry's total concepts, version, type vocabulary, and counts.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Summarize the public canon
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
wake.platformReturn the public platform-self payload — agenttool's identity, repo, doctrine roots.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "repo": it reads repositories.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the public platform-self payload — agenttool's identity, repo, doctrine roots. The platform block of GET /public/self.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Read AgentTool's public platform description
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:51 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-11-25
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.agenttool.dev/v1/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including canon.by_type (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncanon.by_type
The server marks "canon.by_type" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "canon.by_type" says "type": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agenttool https://api.agenttool.dev/v1/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agenttool https://api.agenttool.dev/v1/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agenttool__canon_lookup",
"mcp__agenttool__canon_list_types",
"mcp__agenttool__canon_summary",
"mcp__agenttool__wake_platform"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agenttool__canon_by_type"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenttool. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agenttool__wake_platform private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.agenttool/agenttool/verify?hash=c741d89dec1cd6abd7ea62eb6598d7dad015276ce453b08fa50ed4fbaa4bce3f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c741d89dec1c, from Nov 11, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agenttool/agenttool/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.agenttool/agenttool)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.
agenttool MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agenttool MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the agenttool MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agenttool MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the agenttool MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. canon.by_type, canon.lookup, canon.list_types, canon.summary and wake.platform.
Does the agenttool MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agenttool MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the agenttool MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.