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Calotype MCP server

dev.calotype/screenshotcalotype.devstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Let your AI agent see any public web page: one screenshot tool, returns the page as an image.

1 tool: 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Calotype MCP server can do

The Calotype MCP server is published by calotype.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (screenshot); 1 tool can send data out of your system (screenshot).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • screenshotTake a screenshot of a public web page and return it as an image.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "screenshot" says "screenshot": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Take a screenshot of a public web page and return it as an image. Use it to see what a page looks like: its layout, text, charts or errors as rendered in Chromium. Only public http(s) pages; private and local addresses are refused. Each successful call counts as one screenshot against the key's monthly quota; failed ones do not. Full-page captures of long pages can be large; jpeg or webp keeps them small.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Screenshot a web page

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http screenshot https://calotype.dev/mcp?ref=mcp-registry --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http screenshot https://calotype.dev/mcp?ref=mcp-registry --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__screenshot__screenshot"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as screenshot. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__screenshot__screenshot untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.calotype/screenshot/verify?hash=d07a5f9afeaaa0e9f34a2a7a2aaea7bca94413fc4ac9fa08080d2634218dc7cf" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d07a5f9afeaa, from Nov 19, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.calotype/screenshot/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.calotype/screenshot
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.calotype/screenshot.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.calotype/screenshot)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Calotype MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Calotype MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Calotype MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Calotype MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Calotype MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 read. screenshot.

Does the Calotype MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Calotype MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): screenshot.

Has the Calotype MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.