codefmt MCP server
dev.codefmt/codefmtcodefmt.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Format/lint JS, Python, HubL for automation platforms. Tools: format_code, format_json, ask_codefmt
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the codefmt MCP server can do
The codefmt MCP server is published by codefmt.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: format_code, ask_codefmt and format_json), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
ask_codefmtAsk a natural-language question about codefmt: formatting and linting JavaScript, Python, and HubL for automation platforms (Zapier, n8n, Pipedream, Make, HubSpot).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask a natural-language question about codefmt: formatting and linting JavaScript, Python, and HubL for automation platforms (Zapier, n8n, Pipedream, Make, HubSpot). Returns a grounded answer drawn from codefmt's own content with cited source URLs and a confidence score (0-1, how much of the question the answer covers, weighted toward its rarer terms); off-topic or too-weakly-matched questions are refused rather than guessed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
format_codeFormat and lint JavaScript, Python, or HubL code for Zapier, n8n, Pipedream, Make, or HubSpot.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "format_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Format and lint JavaScript, Python, or HubL code for Zapier, n8n, Pipedream, Make, or HubSpot. Wraps the source in each platform's runtime shell before formatting so top-level await, bare return, and injected globals don't break the formatter. Returns formatted code plus lint diagnostics.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
format_jsonFormat (pretty-print or minify) a JSON document, optionally sorting object keys.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Format (pretty-print or minify) a JSON document, optionally sorting object keys. Number literals are preserved exactly (64-bit IDs safe); parse errors report the exact line and column.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:51 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://codefmt.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including format_code (write), ask_codefmt (write), format_json (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnformat_code
The server marks "format_code" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:format_codeChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http codefmt https://codefmt.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http codefmt https://codefmt.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__codefmt__format_code",
"mcp__codefmt__ask_codefmt",
"mcp__codefmt__format_json"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as codefmt. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.codefmt/codefmt/verify?hash=141f1b8d5e421412edc624a81075c4a3e29413a2319fa49e44cb6e4d67dbe6fd" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 141f1b8d5e42, from Nov 15, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.codefmt/codefmt/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.codefmt/codefmt)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.
codefmt MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the codefmt MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the codefmt MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the codefmt MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the codefmt MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. format_code, ask_codefmt and format_json.
Does the codefmt MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the codefmt MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the codefmt MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 1, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.