emailmd MCP server
dev.emailmd/emailmdemailmd.devstreamable-httpv0.13.3Scanned
Render markdown into email-safe HTML, lint drafts for deliverability problems, and preview emails.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the emailmd MCP server can do
The emailmd MCP server is published by emailmd.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: render and lint), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (read_docs).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.13.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
lintCheck emailmd markdown for deliverability, accessibility, and readability problems without rendering it: missing alt text, http:// links, Gmail's 102KB clip limit, generic link tex…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check emailmd markdown for deliverability, accessibility, and readability problems without rendering it: missing alt text, http:// links, Gmail's 102KB clip limit, generic link text, spam-trigger phrases, and more. Fix warnings before sending; suggestions are sometimes intentional (e.g. transactional emails without an unsubscribe link).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Lint an email
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
renderRender emailmd markdown into email-safe HTML.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Render emailmd markdown into email-safe HTML. Returns html (the complete email document), text (the plain-text MIME part), meta (frontmatter), warnings (non-fatal repairs made while rendering; aim for none), htmlBytes, and previewUrl (a live browser preview of this exact document to share with the user).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Render an email
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
read_docsFetch emailmd documentation from emailmd.dev.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_docs" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "read_docs" says "read" and "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch emailmd documentation from emailmd.dev. Call with no arguments for the index of all pages; pass page to read one (e.g. 'buttons', 'frontmatter', 'theme', 'directives/hero'). Read the relevant page before using syntax you are not sure about.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Read emailmd docs
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:52 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.emailmd.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including render (write), lint (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Install
Pinned to version 0.13.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http emailmd https://www.emailmd.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http emailmd https://www.emailmd.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__emailmd__read_docs"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__emailmd__render",
"mcp__emailmd__lint"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as emailmd. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__emailmd__read_docs private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.emailmd/emailmd/verify?hash=4ddabb1580f3bcbd18e98ded6ccd3b4652b49e600d2db9ee41c20a3af6adbdd9" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4ddabb1580f3, from Nov 14, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.emailmd/emailmd/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.emailmd/emailmd)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
emailmd MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the emailmd MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the emailmd MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the emailmd MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the emailmd MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. render, lint and read_docs.
Does the emailmd MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the emailmd MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the emailmd MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 14, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.