Skip to content

Exactlane Preflight MCP server

dev.exactlane/preflightexactlane.devstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Caller-specific static MCP capability fit evidence. No live probing; caller owns the decision.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Exactlane Preflight MCP server can do

The Exactlane Preflight MCP server is published by exactlane.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_mcp_capability), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_mcp_capabilityBefore relying on an MCP capability, answer one question about it: does this exact revision satisfy the requirements your workflow declares?1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...argument and requirements shape with no credential and no quota, so start there when unsur..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before relying on an MCP capability, answer one question about it: does this exact revision satisfy the requirements your workflow declares? Call it for new work, after a dependency changes, after your own requirements change, or when an integration has already failed and you need to know whether the capability is why (the public triggers are NEW_WORK, DEPENDENCY_CHANGE, REQUIREMENTS_CHANGE, INTEGRATION_FAILURE, OTHER_REAL_WORK). You supply both sides: a capability snapshot you already hold and your workflow requirements. Nothing is fetched and no endpoint is probed, so the answer is reproducible from what you sent and is only ever as good as that snapshot. You get back a verdict with per-check results, coverage, and the limits of the check itself. That is evidence, not an instruction: the caller owns CONTINUE, UPDATE_INTEGRATION, and HOLD, and no verdict maps to any of them. Optional previous (an earlier snapshot and its finished report) adds a revision_receipt comparing that conclusion with this revision. Budget before calling: a Preview grant allows three checks, while POST /v0/snapshot-lint validates argument and requirements shape with no credential and no quota, so start there when unsure. This tool never writes usage-events (usage_event_created is always false) and never discloses the internal Preview bearer; attest your own decision afterwards on a finished owned check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:52 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://exactlane.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including check_mcp_capability (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http preflight https://exactlane.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http preflight https://exactlane.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__preflight__check_mcp_capability"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as preflight. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.exactlane/preflight/verify?hash=4497152a7807654f0658ecb320b3787058457f7f9eeb41866fdf6ad4254811b0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4497152a7807, from Nov 11, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.exactlane/preflight/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.exactlane/preflight
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.exactlane/preflight.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.exactlane/preflight)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

Exactlane Preflight MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Exactlane Preflight MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Exactlane Preflight MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Exactlane Preflight MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Exactlane Preflight MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. check_mcp_capability.

Does the Exactlane Preflight MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Exactlane Preflight MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Exactlane Preflight MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.