Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server
dev.fencer/intelfencer.devstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Free merged CVE, GHSA and OSV feed: search, a live feed, a lockfile check and data reports.
5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server can do
The Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server is published by fencer.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (report_feedback) and create or change data (1 tool: check_stack), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_vulnerability); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_stack); 1 tool can send data out of your system (report_feedback). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (long-description and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
report_feedbackSend a report to the Fencer Intel team: an entry with wrong data (severity, affected or fixed versions, packages, KEV, EPSS), a vulnerability or fix the feed is missing, or a tool …Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en you have one. Never include secrets, credentials, lockfile contents or personal data: pe..."
Description, as the server wrote it Send a report to the Fencer Intel team: an entry with wrong data (severity, affected or fixed versions, packages, KEV, EPSS), a vulnerability or fix the feed is missing, or a tool that returned something wrong. Use it only when the user asks to report something, or agrees to a report you propose. Say what you saw, where (the entry id, or the tool and the arguments you passed), what you expected, and a source link when you have one. Never include secrets, credentials, lockfile contents or personal data: people read every report, and it is kept for 365 days. If the call returns an error, the report was not saved. Nobody replies, so it is not a way to ask a question. At most 5 reports per 60 seconds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Report feedback
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_stackCheck exact package versions for known vulnerabilities.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,323 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...support (eol). No matches means none were found, not that the packages are safe."
Description, as the server wrote it Check exact package versions for known vulnerabilities. Pass a lockfile's contents (package-lock.json, bun.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, Cargo.lock, go.sum, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, mix.lock, packages.lock.json, gradle.lockfile, .github/workflows/*.yml, action.yml, pubspec.lock, Package.resolved, renv.lock, Manifest.toml, cabal.project.freeze, *.opam.locked) with its filename, an SBOM (CycloneDX JSON, SPDX 2 JSON, Syft JSON, e.g. from `syft <image> -o cyclonedx-json`; up to 10 MB) in the same field, or a package list. An SBOM's language packages are checked like a lockfile's; its OS packages (deb, apk, rpm and Arch alpm purls) are matched against the distro advisories for their release and come back in "os" (findings with the fixed version per package; releases with no advisories on file are marked unchecked, never guessed, and Arch-based distros such as Manjaro as unchecked "derivative"; a finding or package with possible: true comes from Arch's tracker, which gives no introduced version, so the version may predate the bug: say "may be affected"; keep the license objects of share-alike distro data with it). A language finding with unreviewed: true was matched on the maintainers' own GitHub advisory, or on the packages a CVE record names when its CNA's scope covers them, which GitHub has not reviewed yet: say so. A finding with inferred: true was matched on a package inferred from the CVE's product name and repository (no advisory lists the package), by the CVE's own version range: say it probably applies; unchecked items with reason "inferred" are such packages whose CVE gives no versions to compare, and with reason "maintainer" packages a maintainers' advisory names with a range Intel can't compare for that version, and with reason "cve" packages a CVE record names whose versions don't decide that one: say they may be affected. A GitHub Actions workflow or action.yml works too: each uses: owner/repo@ref is checked, a floating tag (v4) as the newest release of its line; refs pinned to a commit SHA (without a "# v1.2.3" comment) or a branch come back in "unchecked" with the advisories on file. Also lists versions endoflife.date marks as out of support (eol). No matches means none were found, not that the packages are safe.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check dependencies
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_vulnerabilityFull entry for a CVE, GHSA or OSV id: description, CVSS, CISA KEV status, due date, and ransomware use (kev.ransomware is true only for Known; kev.ransomwareUse is known, unknown o…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_vulnerability" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "db": it reads databases.
Description, as the server wrote it Full entry for a CVE, GHSA or OSV id: description, CVSS, CISA KEV status, due date, and ransomware use (kev.ransomware is true only for Known; kev.ransomwareUse is known, unknown or none), EPSS score and the date it first reached 10%, public exploits (Exploit-DB, Metasploit), affected packages with fixed versions, affected products, references and source records; where known, ATT&CK techniques (attack), ransomware groups (ransomware) and the Project Zero zero-day listing (zeroDay); vendorAdvisories holds vendor CSAF advisories and VEX statements (CISA, Red Hat): per product affected, fixed or not affected, with the remediation and a link (keep the credit of each with it); maintainerAdvisory links the advisory the maintainers published on their GitHub repository and says whether it is unreviewed (GitHub has not reviewed it yet, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers’ word); inferredPackages (only when no record lists packages) are npm or PyPI packages inferred because a CVE product has the package’s name and the CVE references the GitHub repository the package’s registry entry names: low confidence, say "probably" and that no advisory lists them.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get one vulnerability
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_feedNewest entries of a feed, the same as the /feed endpoint, ordered by `listed`: when the entry became news here (its publish date, or later if it reached us late or turned critical …No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_feed" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Newest entries of a feed, the same as the /feed endpoint, ordered by `listed`: when the entry became news here (its publish date, or later if it reached us late or turned critical later). `filter`: critical = in CISA KEV, or CISA SSVC exploitation "active", or CVSS 9+ in a listed technology (WordPress plugins and themes excepted; WordPress itself counts), or CVSS 7+ with EPSS ≥ 0.1; kev = in CISA KEV (ordered by date added). `listed_since` keeps entries whose `listed` is at or after an ISO date or timestamp; with `filter` kev alone the cut is the KEV day, which is what that list sorts by. `kev_added_since` keeps entries CISA added to KEV on or after that UTC day, and orders the list by that date unless `listed_since` is also set. An entry must match any value of a field and every field given.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List a feed
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
searchSearch Fencer Intel entries (CVE, GHSA and OSV advisories merged into one entry per vulnerability).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search Fencer Intel entries (CVE, GHSA and OSV advisories merged into one entry per vulnerability). Free text in `q` matches ids, titles, descriptions, vendors, products and package names; structured parameters narrow the result. `published` is the CVE publish date. `listed_since` is when the entry became news here, and `kev_added_since` is the day CISA added it to KEV (both an ISO date or timestamp; a KEV time cuts on that UTC day). Each result says why it matched; when nothing matches, `broader` lists relaxed queries that do return results.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search vulnerabilities
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__intel__report_feedback"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://intel.fencer.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_stack (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infocheck_stack
The description is 2,323 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...support (eol). No matches means none were found, not that the packages are safe."
- Inforeport_feedback
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...en you have one. Never include secrets, credentials, lockfile contents or personal data: pe..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 4 changed.+1 added~4 changedView diff
- Added:report_feedbackCan't be undone
- Changed:check_stackChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:get_vulnerabilityOnly readsdescriptionannotations
- Changed:list_feedOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:searchOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http intel https://intel.fencer.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http intel https://intel.fencer.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__intel__search",
"mcp__intel__get_vulnerability",
"mcp__intel__list_feed"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__intel__check_stack",
"mcp__intel__report_feedback"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as intel. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__intel__get_vulnerability private-data
- mcp__intel__check_stack untrusted-input
- mcp__intel__report_feedback outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.fencer/intel/verify?hash=5d4469ba1518f3bdb3608448c31b1c75870283b5a21bfcedebaf17057895c524" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5d4469ba1518, from Nov 19, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.fencer/intel/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.fencer/intel)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: report_feedback.
What tools does the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read. report_feedback, check_stack, search, get_vulnerability and list_feed.
Does the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): report_feedback.
Has the Fencer Intel vulnerability feed MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.