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Sanctions Screening MCP server

dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screeninghatchloop.devstreamable-httpv0.2.13Scanned

Screen a name or entity against OFAC SDN, the EU Consolidated list and the UK list.

8 tools: 5 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Sanctions Screening MCP server can do

The Sanctions Screening MCP server is published by hatchloop.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: self_test, check_compliance, verify_company_record, screen_sanctions and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool can send data out of your system (check_compliance).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.2.13.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • check_complianceFree, instant pre-flight for the compliance gate: runs the SAME TCPA/GDPR/CASL/CAN-SPAM/10DLC checks as send_message and call_business, in preview mode -- nothing is sent, nothing …Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, instant pre-flight for the compliance gate: runs the SAME TCPA/GDPR/CASL/CAN-SPAM/10DLC checks as send_message and call_business, in preview mode -- nothing is sent, nothing changes. Tells you whether a send would be permitted before you pay, and if not, names the exact rule and how to fix it. De-risks a paid send the way check_booking_link de-risks a paid booking. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check Compliance
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • map_trade_restrictionFree cross-border screening of destination and parties: DOES NOT CLASSIFY THE PRODUCT: echoed back, never checked against export-control lists, so a controlled item to an unrestric…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free cross-border screening of destination and parties: DOES NOT CLASSIFY THE PRODUCT: echoed back, never checked against export-control lists, so a controlled item to an unrestricted destination returns 'partial', never 'clear'. Not an export-control clearance -- classify HS/ECCN yourself. Never fabricates a tariff rate, a clear, or a restricted status. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Map Trade Restriction
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_sanctionsFree screening of a name/entity (Latin or Arabic script) against sanctions lists: OFAC SDN (US Treasury), EU consolidated list (European Commission), UK Sanctions List (FCDO).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free screening of a name/entity (Latin or Arabic script) against sanctions lists: OFAC SDN (US Treasury), EU consolidated list (European Commission), UK Sanctions List (FCDO). THE UN CONSOLIDATED LIST IS NOT SCREENED -- no licence permits redistribution. Never fabricates a match or clear: check lists_screened; reason_code 'partial_screening' (never 'clear') if any source failed. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen Sanctions
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • self_testService health probe: runs 6 internal checks and reports how many passed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Service health probe: runs 6 internal checks and reports how many passed. Confirms the server is up and responding - it does NOT probe each tool individually. Use to verify connectivity before production use. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Self Test
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_company_recordFree, live lookup of a company official registry record.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, live lookup of a company official registry record. Queries the GLEIF global LEI registry (primary, 2.6 million legal entities worldwide) and SEC EDGAR (US public companies) to return the official legal name, LEI, entity status, jurisdiction, registered address, and registry authority. Never fabricates: if the company is not found in these free registries, returns an honest not_found with the sources that were queried. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify Company Record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_outcomeRetrieve the final OutcomeReceipt for a completed operation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_outcome" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the final OutcomeReceipt for a completed operation. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Outcome
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_statusQuery the current state of any in-flight async operation by operation_id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Query the current state of any in-flight async operation by operation_id. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • preview_costReturn an expected cost estimate, latency estimate, and success-probability estimate for a proposed call before execution.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preview_cost" says "preview": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return an expected cost estimate, latency estimate, and success-probability estimate for a proposed call before execution. Returns the exact price when it is fixed, and a min/max range when the cost depends on channel or outcome. It does not promise an accuracy percentage - check cost_range. [free, no key]

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Preview Cost
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://hatchloop.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/sanctions-screening
Authorization servers
https://api.hatchloop.dev
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://hatchloop.dev/mcp/sanctions-screening: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including self_test (write), check_compliance (write), verify_company_record (write), screen_sanctions (write), map_trade_restriction (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.13. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screening https://hatchloop.dev/mcp/sanctions-screening
claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screening https://hatchloop.dev/mcp/sanctions-screening

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__get_status",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__get_outcome",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__preview_cost"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__self_test",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__check_compliance",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__verify_company_record",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__screen_sanctions",
      "mcp__sanctions-screening__map_trade_restriction"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctions-screening. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__sanctions-screening__check_compliance outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screening/verify?hash=b5c1310dbe4ec1e41d5f5bb2f6c97a1cc158bfe78c865964370ba7449c4c62e3" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b5c1310dbe4e, from Nov 17, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screening/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screening
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screening.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.hatchloop/sanctions-screening)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:11 UTC.

Sanctions Screening MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Sanctions Screening MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Sanctions Screening MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Sanctions Screening MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Sanctions Screening MCP server have?

8 tools: 5 write, 3 read. self_test, check_compliance, verify_company_record, screen_sanctions, map_trade_restriction, get_status, get_outcome and preview_cost.

Does the Sanctions Screening MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Sanctions Screening MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_compliance.

Has the Sanctions Screening MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.