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Wayreceipt MCP server

dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceiptwayreceipt.pages.devstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Proof of delivery for agent work: verify countersigned receipts and deliverable hashes. Free.

4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Wayreceipt MCP server can do

The Wayreceipt MCP server is published by wayreceipt.pages.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (publish_delivery_receipt) and create or change data (1 tool: verify_delivery_receipt), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (lookup_delivery_receipt); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_delivery_receipt and publish_delivery_receipt); 1 tool can send data out of your system (publish_delivery_receipt). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • publish_delivery_receiptPublishes a countersigned receipt (already signed by both seller and buyer) to the public log, as lasting proof of delivery for a deliverable hash.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "publish_delivery_receipt" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "publish_delivery_receipt" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.receipt.description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.receipt.description: "...eceipt delivery receipt (W3C Verifiable Credential 2.0 with eddsa-jcs-2022 proofs)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publishes a countersigned receipt (already signed by both seller and buyer) to the public log, as lasting proof of delivery for a deliverable hash. Signing happens on your side with the free library; this server never holds keys. The server re-verifies the receipt and rejects seller-only or invalid ones. Optional seller_link and buyer_link pages are checked for proof that they belong to the signing key (match, mismatch or unreachable). Published receipts are public.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_delivery_receiptProof of delivery check.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.receipt.description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.receipt.description: "...eceipt delivery receipt (W3C Verifiable Credential 2.0 with eddsa-jcs-2022 proofs)."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Proof of delivery check. Verifies a delivery receipt: the seller's signature over the deliverable hash (SHA-256) and, if present, the buyer's countersignature. Returns countersigned, seller-only or invalid, with reasons. Optionally compares a file's SHA-256 with the deliverable hash. Relevant to a delivery dispute or to checking a seller before payment. Free, no sign-up, no API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • log_statsCounts from the public log of countersigned receipts: receipts, distinct seller keys, distinct buyer keys and distinct seller-buyer pairs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "log_stats" says "log": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Counts from the public log of countersigned receipts: receipts, distinct seller keys, distinct buyer keys and distinct seller-buyer pairs. Receipts the Wayreceipt team made for testing and removed entries are not counted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lookup_delivery_receiptFinds countersigned receipts in the public log by receipt ID, deliverable hash (file SHA-256) or seller key.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_delivery_receipt" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file_sha256), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Finds countersigned receipts in the public log by receipt ID, deliverable hash (file SHA-256) or seller key. Shows a seller's published proof of delivery history. The log only holds receipts that a seller or buyer chose to publish, and a key is not a verified identity.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__wayreceipt__publish_delivery_receipt"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://wayreceipt.pages.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including publish_delivery_receipt (irreversible), verify_delivery_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 8, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Oct 31, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info
  • The input schema at properties.receipt.description mentions "Credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.receipt.description: "...eceipt delivery receipt (W3C Verifiable Credential 2.0 with eddsa-jcs-2022 proofs)."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.receipt.description mentions "Credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.receipt.description: "...eceipt delivery receipt (W3C Verifiable Credential 2.0 with eddsa-jcs-2022 proofs)."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 2
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http wayreceipt https://wayreceipt.pages.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http wayreceipt https://wayreceipt.pages.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__wayreceipt__lookup_delivery_receipt",
      "mcp__wayreceipt__log_stats"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__wayreceipt__verify_delivery_receipt",
      "mcp__wayreceipt__publish_delivery_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as wayreceipt. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__wayreceipt__verify_delivery_receipt untrusted-input
  • mcp__wayreceipt__lookup_delivery_receipt private-data
  • mcp__wayreceipt__publish_delivery_receipt untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceipt/verify?hash=8d03c6dcee3885fad949b355d0034f3c68efcf410a9cdb06bf5fbf6547e06e22" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8d03c6dcee38, from Nov 8, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceipt/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceipt
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceipt.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.pages.wayreceipt/wayreceipt)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Wayreceipt MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Wayreceipt MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Wayreceipt MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Wayreceipt MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: publish_delivery_receipt.

What tools does the Wayreceipt MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. publish_delivery_receipt, verify_delivery_receipt, lookup_delivery_receipt and log_stats.

Does the Wayreceipt MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Wayreceipt MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): publish_delivery_receipt.

Has the Wayreceipt MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.