100pro-token-risk MCP server
dev.rendraputra/100pro-token-riskrendraputra.devstreamable-httpv1.0.4Scanned
Read-only risk tools: token screen, contract source, wallet. $0.10 USDC on Base.
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the 100pro-token-risk MCP server can do
The 100pro-token-risk MCP server is published by rendraputra.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: token_risk_screen, contract_source_check and wallet_risk_screen), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (token_risk_screen, contract_source_check and wallet_risk_screen).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.4.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
contract_source_checkContract-level due diligence for an EVM contract address: whether the source is verified and through which route (sourcify / verifier-alliance / eth-bytecode-db), fully vs partiall…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.address.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.examples[0]: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"
Description, as the server wrote it Contract-level due diligence for an EVM contract address: whether the source is verified and through which route (sourcify / verifier-alliance / eth-bytecode-db), fully vs partially verified, whether the deployed bytecode still matches the verified source, proxy pattern and implementation address, deployer address and creation tx, contract age, and a capability scan of the verified source (and of the proxy implementation) for mint, pause, blacklist, selfdestruct and delegatecall. Returns markdown ending in a **Verdict** line. Up to 5 comma-separated addresses per call. $0.1 USDC for a single contract address, $0.25 for a 2-5 address batch, on Base (x402 v2, no account, no API key). An unpaid call answers HTTP 402 with the payment challenge; sign it and retry with the payment in the call `_meta`. Read-only: it never signs, transfers, or approves anything on the caller's behalf.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Contract source check (EVM, read-only)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_risk_screenPre-trade risk screen for an EVM token contract or a Solana SPL mint (Base, Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Arbitrum, Solana).Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.token.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.token.examples[0]: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"
- Warn
The input schema at properties.token.examples[1] contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.token.examples[1]: "So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112"
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-trade risk screen for an EVM token contract or a Solana SPL mint (Base, Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Arbitrum, Solana). Returns a markdown report: honeypot/tax/owner flags, LP-lock state, mint and freeze authority, transfer fee/hook, holder concentration, liquidity depth, wash-trade flags, and a final **Verdict** line. Up to 5 comma-separated tokens per call. $0.1 USDC for a single token contract / SPL mint, $0.25 for a 2-5 address batch, on Base (x402 v2, no account, no API key). An unpaid call answers HTTP 402 with the payment challenge; sign it and retry with the payment in the call `_meta`. Read-only: it never signs, transfers, or approves anything on the caller's behalf.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Token risk screen (EVM + Solana, read-only)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_risk_screenWallet-level due diligence for an EVM address: externally-owned account vs contract (and proxy type), age from its first transaction, activity counters, native balance, funding sou…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.address.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.examples[0]: "0x6aAFF8af0ae8017725312C388bA3745dfE91185B"
Description, as the server wrote it Wallet-level due diligence for an EVM address: externally-owned account vs contract (and proxy type), age from its first transaction, activity counters, native balance, funding source, how many contracts it has deployed, Blockscout scam/reputation/tags, and GoPlus address-security flags (sanctioned, phishing, mixer, money laundering, honeypot-related, malicious contracts created). Returns markdown with a **Verdict** and a flag list. Up to 5 comma-separated addresses per call. $0.1 USDC for a single wallet address, $0.25 for a 2-5 address batch, on Base (x402 v2, no account, no API key). An unpaid call answers HTTP 402 with the payment challenge; sign it and retry with the payment in the call `_meta`. Read-only: it never signs, transfers, or approves anything on the caller's behalf.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallet risk screen (EVM, read-only)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:52 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://x402.rendraputra.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including token_risk_screen (write), contract_source_check (write), wallet_risk_screen (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The input schema at properties.token.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.token.examples[0]: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"
The input schema at properties.token.examples[1] contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.token.examples[1]: "So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112"
The input schema at properties.address.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.examples[0]: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"
The input schema at properties.address.examples[0] contains a 42-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.address.examples[0]: "0x6aAFF8af0ae8017725312C388bA3745dfE91185B"
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http 100pro-token-risk https://x402.rendraputra.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http 100pro-token-risk https://x402.rendraputra.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__100pro-token-risk__token_risk_screen",
"mcp__100pro-token-risk__contract_source_check",
"mcp__100pro-token-risk__wallet_risk_screen"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as 100pro-token-risk. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__100pro-token-risk__token_risk_screen untrusted-input
- mcp__100pro-token-risk__contract_source_check untrusted-input
- mcp__100pro-token-risk__wallet_risk_screen untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.rendraputra/100pro-token-risk/verify?hash=32f5b87229ce1681adff5f7b5ccba02550134ed6b20914809702d61c94d8b0a1" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 32f5b87229ce, from Nov 11, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.rendraputra/100pro-token-risk/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.rendraputra/100pro-token-risk)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
100pro-token-risk MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the 100pro-token-risk MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the 100pro-token-risk MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the 100pro-token-risk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the 100pro-token-risk MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. token_risk_screen, contract_source_check and wallet_risk_screen.
Does the 100pro-token-risk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the 100pro-token-risk MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the 100pro-token-risk MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.