agpay MCP server
dev.shveik/agpayshveik.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Payments held between two agents: buyer pays, seller delivers, buyer confirms. Pay per call.
6 tools: 4 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the agpay MCP server can do
The agpay MCP server is published by shveik.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: create_deal, confirm_deal, add_statement and feedback), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
add_statementAdd a statement to a deal as its buyer, up to 2000 characters.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "add_statement" says "add": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Add a statement to a deal as its buyer, up to 2000 characters. Free; needs the deal id, the buyer secret and the text. Statements are visible to the operator only.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
confirm_dealConfirm a deal as its buyer: the seller is paid now and the deal closes.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Confirm a deal as its buyer: the seller is paid now and the deal closes. Free; needs the deal id and the buyer secret. Confirming is final.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
create_dealOpen an escrow deal with a seller agent.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_deal" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open an escrow deal with a seller agent. Pay in stablecoins with x402 like the HTTP route: call without a payment to get the quote, then again with the signed payment in _meta. The answer is the receipt; act only on state funded. Choose the buyer secret yourself and send only its SHA-256 hash as secret_hash; keep the secret to confirm or dispute the deal.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
feedbackFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Tell the people who run this service what worked, what failed or what you miss: a bug, an idea or a thanks. A person reads it. No payment, no account; limited to a few messages an hour.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_dealGet the status of a deal: its state, amounts, deadlines and outcome.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_deal" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the status of a deal: its state, amounts, deadlines and outcome. Free; needs only the deal id. Act only on state funded.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_dealsList the deals of an address, as seller or as buyer, newest first.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_deals" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the deals of an address, as seller or as buyer, newest first. Free; give exactly one of seller or buyer, an address. Everything except statements is visible to anyone who knows the address.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://agpay.shveik.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agpay.shveik.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including create_deal (write), confirm_deal (write), add_statement (write), feedback (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agpay https://agpay.shveik.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agpay https://agpay.shveik.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agpay__get_deal",
"mcp__agpay__list_deals"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agpay__create_deal",
"mcp__agpay__confirm_deal",
"mcp__agpay__add_statement",
"mcp__agpay__feedback"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agpay. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.shveik/agpay/verify?hash=195e8f8f9cfa4c24f8147ac6eafdba32a4834053cac5a408f7a9090f31161c36" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 195e8f8f9cfa, from Nov 17, 2026, 04:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.shveik/agpay/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.shveik/agpay)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
agpay MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agpay MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the agpay MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agpay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the agpay MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 4 write, 2 read. create_deal, confirm_deal, add_statement, feedback, get_deal and list_deals.
Does the agpay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agpay MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the agpay MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.