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SocialTap MCP server

dev.socialtap/mcpsocialtap.devstreamable-httpv1.1799.0Scanned

Social media scraper API. Live data from any public link.

12 tools: 3 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 4
  • Reads text others write · 10
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the SocialTap MCP server can do

The SocialTap MCP server is published by socialtap.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: list_posts, list_comments and call_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

4 tools read private data (list_comments, search, search_docs and 1 more); 10 tools bring in text other people can write (find_endpoint, get_post, list_posts and 7 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (get_post, list_comments, get_transcript and 1 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.1799.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • call_endpointCall any endpoint by the ID find_endpoint gives (tiktok.sound_posts), with the arguments it gives: the data the other tools here don't cover.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call any endpoint by the ID find_endpoint gives (tiktok.sound_posts), with the arguments it gives: the data the other tools here don't cover. Same price, results and cursors as the endpoint's own tool.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_commentsThe comments of a post, a page per call: public comments and replies with their author, text, place in the thread, and like and reply counts.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_comments" says "list": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "comment": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "thread": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_comments" says "list" and "comment": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "comment" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "list_comments" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_comments" says "list": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The comments of a post, a page per call: public comments and replies with their author, text, place in the thread, and like and reply counts. Pass url: its link or ID. Price per successful page: Bluesky, Facebook, Hacker News, Instagram, Reddit, Rumble, Snapchat, Threads, TikTok, X, YouTube: 1 credit. LinkedIn: 1 credit (public page) or 5 credits (data partner). Follow next_cursor while it is set; a short page is not the end.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_postsThe posts of a profile, a page per call: public posts (videos, reels, shorts, photos, carousels, tweets and text) with their author, text, media, and views, likes and comments.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_posts" says "list": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "post": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_posts" says "list" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "post" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "list_posts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_posts" says "list": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The posts of a profile, a page per call: public posts (videos, reels, shorts, photos, carousels, tweets and text) with their author, text, media, and views, likes and comments. Pass handle: a profile link, @handle, username or ID. Price per successful page: Bluesky, Facebook, Instagram, Kwai, Reddit, Rumble, Threads, TikTok, Truth Social, X, YouTube: 1 credit. LinkedIn: 1 credit (public page) or 10 credits (data partner). Follow next_cursor while it is set; a short page is not the end.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • find_endpointFind which SocialTap tool and endpoint serves a need ("TikTok comments", "YouTube transcript") or a link: returns the best matches with the tool and arguments to call, the price, t…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_endpoint" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "comment": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find which SocialTap tool and endpoint serves a need ("TikTok comments", "YouTube transcript") or a link: returns the best matches with the tool and arguments to call, the price, the parameters and an example result. Use it when no tool obviously fits, or to check which platforms and links a tool takes. Free, and it works without an API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_accountGet the account, balance and calling key.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the account, balance and calling key. The account's balance and plan, the low-balance alert threshold, and the calling key: its scopes, spend limit (with what it used this interval) and expiry. Free; never cached. Use it to check the credit balance before a large task; every other result already states credits_remaining.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_engagementEngagement rate, average views, likes and comments, posting cadence and top post for an account, computed from its recent posts the same way on every platform.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_engagement" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "comment": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Engagement rate, average views, likes and comments, posting cadence and top post for an account, computed from its recent posts the same way on every platform. Pass handle: a profile link, @handle, username or ID. Price per successful call: Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Rumble, TikTok, X, YouTube: 1 credit. LinkedIn: 1 credit (public page) or 15 credits (data partner).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_postPublic posts (videos, reels, shorts, photos, carousels, tweets and text) with their author, text, media, and views, likes and comments.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_post" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_post" says "get" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public posts (videos, reels, shorts, photos, carousels, tweets and text) with their author, text, media, and views, likes and comments. Pass url: its link or ID. Price per successful call: 1 credit.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_profilePublic accounts (creators, channels, pages, companies, communities) with their bio, links, and follower and post counts.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_profile" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Public accounts (creators, channels, pages, companies, communities) with their bio, links, and follower and post counts. Pass handle: a profile link, @handle, username or ID. Price per successful call: Apple Music, Bluesky, Facebook, GitHub, Google, Hacker News, Instagram, Komi, Kwai, Lnk.Bio, Linkme, Linktree, Pillar, Pinterest, Reddit, Rumble, Snapchat, SoundCloud, Spotify, Telegram, Threads, TikTok, Truth Social, Twitch, X, YouTube: 1 credit. LinkedIn: 1 credit (public page or web search) or 5 credits (data partner).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_transcriptTimed transcripts of public videos: the platform's caption track, or speech-to-text on the audio when there is none.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_transcript" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Timed transcripts of public videos: the platform's caption track, or speech-to-text on the audio when there is none. Pass url: its link or ID. Price per successful call: Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Reddit, Rumble, TikTok, X, YouTube: 1 credit (captions) or 2 credits + 2 per started minute of media (speech-to-text). Kick, Twitch: 2 credits + 2 per started minute of media.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • read_docRead one SocialTap docs page as Markdown: a path from search_docs or llms.txt (/docs/pagination/), or a full docs URL.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_doc" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "read_doc" says "read" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one SocialTap docs page as Markdown: a path from search_docs or llms.txt (/docs/pagination/), or a full docs URL. Long pages come in parts: call again with cursor=next_cursor for the rest. Free, and it works without an API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_docsSearch the SocialTap docs (guides, the API reference, error codes, schemas, pricing) for a question or term: returns the best-matching sections with their page, a snippet and the p…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the SocialTap docs (guides, the API reference, error codes, schemas, pricing) for a question or term: returns the best-matching sections with their page, a snippet and the path to read with read_doc. Use it before writing integration code. Free, and it works without an API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

160 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 4 outbound tools breaks every one.

Reads private data4
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write10
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__socialtap__call_endpoint",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_post",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_transcript",
      "mcp__socialtap__list_comments"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://socialtap.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://socialtap.dev
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://socialtap.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including list_posts (write), list_comments (write), call_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn
  • The server marks "list_posts" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_posts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "list_comments" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "list_comments" says "list": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1799.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http socialtap https://socialtap.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http socialtap https://socialtap.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__socialtap__find_endpoint",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_profile",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_engagement",
      "mcp__socialtap__search",
      "mcp__socialtap__search_docs",
      "mcp__socialtap__read_doc",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_account"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__socialtap__get_post",
      "mcp__socialtap__list_posts",
      "mcp__socialtap__list_comments",
      "mcp__socialtap__get_transcript",
      "mcp__socialtap__call_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as socialtap. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 11 rules
  • mcp__socialtap__find_endpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__socialtap__get_post untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__socialtap__list_posts untrusted-input
  • mcp__socialtap__get_profile untrusted-input
  • mcp__socialtap__list_comments private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__socialtap__get_transcript untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__socialtap__get_engagement untrusted-input
  • mcp__socialtap__search private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__socialtap__call_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__socialtap__search_docs private-data
  • mcp__socialtap__read_doc private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.socialtap/mcp/verify?hash=f4ee85a460b8395717230548de2515a4074874e7119eb0b38e5223e4002cc7d1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f4ee85a460b8, from Nov 17, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.socialtap/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.socialtap/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.socialtap/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.socialtap/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

SocialTap MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the SocialTap MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the SocialTap MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the SocialTap MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the SocialTap MCP server have?

12 tools: 3 write, 9 read. list_posts, list_comments, call_endpoint, find_endpoint, get_post, get_profile, get_transcript, get_engagement and 4 more.

Does the SocialTap MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the SocialTap MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_post, list_comments, get_transcript and call_endpoint.

Has the SocialTap MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.