StitchAPI Docs MCP server
dev.stitchapi/docsstitchapi.devstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Search and read the StitchAPI docs: search_docs finds relevant sections, get_doc reads a page.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the StitchAPI Docs MCP server can do
The StitchAPI Docs MCP server is published by stitchapi.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools read private data (search_docs and get_doc); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_doc); 1 tool can send data out of your system (get_doc). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_docFetch a full StitchAPI documentation page as Markdown — the "read the whole thing" escape hatch for a search_docs hit.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_doc" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_doc" says "get" and "doc": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a full StitchAPI documentation page as Markdown — the "read the whole thing" escape hatch for a search_docs hit. Pass a `url` (as returned by search_docs) or a `slug` like "guides/resilience/throttle".
search_docsSearch the StitchAPI documentation semantically (hybrid BM25 + vector).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the StitchAPI documentation semantically (hybrid BM25 + vector). Returns the most relevant doc sections as excerpts with deep links — never full pages. Follow up with get_doc to read a full page.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__docs__get_doc"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:52 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http docs https://stitchapi.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http docs https://stitchapi.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__docs__search_docs"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__docs__get_doc"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docs. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__docs__search_docs private-data
- mcp__docs__get_doc private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.stitchapi/docs/verify?hash=a3c896ea79d5122e880f09f894b1777787712e6ac0cd17f88c4b3c1f6ca6c72f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a3c896ea79d5, from Nov 11, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.stitchapi/docs/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.stitchapi/docs)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
StitchAPI Docs MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the StitchAPI Docs MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the StitchAPI Docs MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the StitchAPI Docs MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the StitchAPI Docs MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. search_docs and get_doc.
Does the StitchAPI Docs MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the StitchAPI Docs MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_doc.
Has the StitchAPI Docs MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.