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Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server

dev.streampresence/receipts-verifierstreampresence.devstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Verify signed proof-of-work receipts and issuer standing for AI agents, plus a hosted Private Log.

11 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 5 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server can do

The Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server is published by streampresence.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (payment_check) and create or change data (7 tools: verify_receipt, issuer_standing, check_agent_card, open_private_log and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_receipt and append_private_log); 6 tools bring in text other people can write (check_agent_card, open_private_log, append_private_log and 3 more).

The fixed checks matched 5 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • payment_checkLaunchpad 'Can you get paid?' check: validate a Base (eip155) or Solana payment address format and optionally parse an x402 quote — each check gets its own status (pass/fail/not_te…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "payment_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Launchpad 'Can you get paid?' check: validate a Base (eip155) or Solana payment address format and optionally parse an x402 quote — each check gets its own status (pass/fail/not_tested/not_applicable/inconclusive). Nothing is paid or settled; a quote that parses is never proof of settlement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • append_private_logFile one entry in your Private Log, exactly as submitted — plaintext, or ciphertext sealed to your own key (we cannot read sealed entries).Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "append_private_log" says "log": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "append_private_log" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "append_private_log" says "log": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    File one entry in your Private Log, exactly as submitted — plaintext, or ciphertext sealed to your own key (we cannot read sealed entries). Returns the signed acknowledgment: seq, entry_hash, chain_head, and our custodian's signature over them. Keep the ack — it is your proof of what we hold. Sign the JCS-canonical bytes of {"action": "private_log_append", "did": <did>, "action_type": <type>, "payload_hash": <sha256 hex of the payload's UTF-8 bytes>}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_agent_cardStream Presence Launchpad readiness check of a public A2A Agent Card: schema validity, signature presence/validity, endpoint liveness (read-only probe — no task is sent), descripti…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Stream Presence Launchpad readiness check of a public A2A Agent Card: schema validity, signature presence/validity, endpoint liveness (read-only probe — no task is sent), description/skills completeness, public contact route. Returns structured per-check findings with a specific fix for every failure — an unreachable card gets a fix, not a badge. Read-only; public https URLs only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • grant_log_accessLet another agent verify you — through us, never through a copy you hand them.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "grant_log_access" says "log": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "grant_log_access" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "grant_log_access" says "log": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Let another agent verify you — through us, never through a copy you hand them. Grants that agent read access to a scoped slice of your log (seq range and/or since a timestamp and/or action types), expiring when you say and revocable any time. The grant is itself appended to your log as an access_granted entry. Sign the JCS-canonical bytes of {"action": "private_log_grant", "did": <did>, "grantee_did": <did>, "scope": <scope>, "expires_at": <normalized UTC ISO timestamp>}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • issuer_standingWhether a did:key is a registered receipt issuer in good standing: class, status, daily cap, any signed revocation, and its receipt count in the log.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Whether a did:key is a registered receipt issuer in good standing: class, status, daily cap, any signed revocation, and its receipt count in the log. An unregistered DID is reported as such.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • open_private_logOpen (or re-open — idempotent) your Private Log with Stream Presence: a hosted, append-only black box for your own actions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "open_private_log" says "open": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open (or re-open — idempotent) your Private Log with Stream Presence: a hosted, append-only black box for your own actions. Only your did:key can read it; nobody can edit it. Sign the JCS-canonical bytes of {"action": "private_log_open", "did": <your did>} with your Ed25519 key and pass the base64url signature.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_readExercise a grant: read the granted slice of another agent's Private Log from the custodian (never from a copy the agent supplied), with per-entry chain verification and our signed …Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verify_read" says "read": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "verify_read" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_read" says "read": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Exercise a grant: read the granted slice of another agent's Private Log from the custodian (never from a copy the agent supplied), with per-entry chain verification and our signed custody attestation over the slice. Your read is appended to the owner's log as access_used. Sign the JCS-canonical bytes of {"action": "private_log_verify_read", "grant_id": <id>, "grantee_did": <your did>}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_receiptFull recompute of one receipt from the public log: log chain intact, issuer Ed25519 signature, issuer registration/class, per-issuer chain link, approval binding, outcome, disputes…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full recompute of one receipt from the public log: log chain intact, issuer Ed25519 signature, issuer registration/class, per-issuer chain link, approval binding, outcome, disputes and countersignatures. Returns the per-check verdict object — never a bare boolean. Give receipt_id, or a full receipt object (its signature is checked and it is compared byte-for-byte with the log entry).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_receiptFetch one receipt from the public log by id: the log entry (sequence, entry hash) and the receipt object, plus its W3C Verifiable Credential sidecar when one was issued.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "credential": it reads secrets.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...receipt object, plus its W3C Verifiable Credential sidecar when one was issued."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one receipt from the public log by id: the log entry (sequence, entry hash) and the receipt object, plus its W3C Verifiable Credential sidecar when one was issued.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • log_statsCurrent state of the public receipts log: entry counts by kind, the chain head hash, and the registered issuer counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "log_stats" says "log": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current state of the public receipts log: entry counts by kind, the chain head hash, and the registered issuer counts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • pull_my_logRead your own log back: entries in seq order, each with its original signed acknowledgment, plus the chain recompute and a custodian-signed attestation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "pull_my_log" says "log": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read your own log back: entries in seq order, each with its original signed acknowledgment, plus the chain recompute and a custodian-signed attestation. Review your own work — what you did, what you promised, where every job stands. Only your signature unlocks it. Sign the JCS-canonical bytes of {"action": "private_log_pull", "did": <did>}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://stream-presence-pow.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including payment_check (irreversible), verify_receipt (write), issuer_standing (write), check_agent_card (write), open_private_log (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

4 warn1 info
  • The server marks "payment_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "payment_check" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "append_private_log" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "append_private_log" says "log": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "grant_log_access" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "grant_log_access" says "log": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "verify_read" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_read" says "read": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "Credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...receipt object, plus its W3C Verifiable Credential sidecar when one was issued."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 added.+5 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http receipts-verifier https://stream-presence-pow.onrender.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http receipts-verifier https://stream-presence-pow.onrender.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__get_receipt",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__log_stats",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__pull_my_log"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__issuer_standing",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__check_agent_card",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__payment_check",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__open_private_log",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__append_private_log",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__grant_log_access",
      "mcp__receipts-verifier__verify_read"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as receipts-verifier. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__get_receipt private-data
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__check_agent_card untrusted-input
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__open_private_log untrusted-input
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__append_private_log private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__pull_my_log untrusted-input
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__grant_log_access untrusted-input
  • mcp__receipts-verifier__verify_read untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.streampresence/receipts-verifier/verify?hash=a01eb511f02f9019356c9738d35133b89f593716af7953a8ac78527f078db4f2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a01eb511f02f, from Nov 21, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.streampresence/receipts-verifier/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.streampresence/receipts-verifier
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.streampresence/receipts-verifier.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.streampresence/receipts-verifier)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 06:17 UTC.

Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: payment_check.

What tools does the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server have?

11 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read. payment_check, verify_receipt, issuer_standing, check_agent_card, open_private_log, append_private_log, grant_log_access, verify_read and 3 more.

Does the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Stream Presence — Receipt Verifier MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.