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Transica MCP server

dev.transica/transicatransica.devstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned

Checks whether a web page is ready for AI agents and whether an MCP server meets directory rules

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Transica MCP server can do

The Transica MCP server is published by transica.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool reads private data (check_mcp_server_directory_rules); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_webpage_ai_readiness and check_mcp_server_directory_rules); 2 tools can send data out of your system (scan_webpage_ai_readiness and check_mcp_server_directory_rules). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_mcp_server_directory_rulesReturns server details, tool counts, directory-specific results, individual checks, and a full report link after connecting to a public remote MCP server and reading its tool list …Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "check_mcp_server_directory_rules" says "directory": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns server details, tool counts, directory-specific results, individual checks, and a full report link after connecting to a public remote MCP server and reading its tool list without calling tools. Use it when someone asks whether an MCP server meets ChatGPT or Claude directory requirements; for scanning a regular webpage's AI readiness, use scan_webpage_ai_readiness instead. Pass url as the public MCP server address to check its connection, sign-in, domain, and tool rules.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check MCP server directory rules
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • scan_webpage_ai_readinessReturns a readiness score, passed and failed checks, category results, top fixes, limitations, and a report link for one public webpage.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "scan_webpage_ai_readiness" says "webpage": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "webpage": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns a readiness score, passed and failed checks, category results, top fixes, limitations, and a report link for one public webpage. Use it when someone asks whether a webpage is accessible and usable by AI agents; for checking an MCP server's directory compliance, use check_mcp_server_directory_rules instead. Pass url to scan the page directly, or use the reportUrl to revisit the detailed results.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scan a webpage for AI readiness
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__transica__check_mcp_server_directory_rules"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 24, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http transica https://transica-mcp.transica.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http transica https://transica-mcp.transica.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__transica__scan_webpage_ai_readiness",
      "mcp__transica__check_mcp_server_directory_rules"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as transica. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__transica__scan_webpage_ai_readiness untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__transica__check_mcp_server_directory_rules private-data, untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.transica/transica/verify?hash=4764c477417efe680f9678999c425e2db7def75bc6b4d83b5fa19a436016c463" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4764c477417e, from Nov 17, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.transica/transica/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.transica/transica
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.transica/transica.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.transica/transica)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 3, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

Transica MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Transica MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Transica MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Transica MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Transica MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. scan_webpage_ai_readiness and check_mcp_server_directory_rules.

Does the Transica MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Transica MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_webpage_ai_readiness and check_mcp_server_directory_rules.

Has the Transica MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.