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vetagent MCP server

dev.vetagent/vetagentvetagent.devstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Pre-trade safety check for AI agents: honeypot, tax, liquidity and rug risk before you buy.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the vetagent MCP server can do

The vetagent MCP server is published by vetagent.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: assess_token_risk), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (assess_token_risk, get_token_liquidity and find_new_hot_pools).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • assess_token_riskSafety check to run BEFORE buying, holding, or recommending a token.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,174 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...'low' as 'no fatal signal found in the checks that ran', never as 'safe to buy'."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Safety check to run BEFORE buying, holding, or recommending a token. Returns an actionable verdict (low / medium / high / unknown), a 0-100 risk score, and the individual signals behind it. Covers on every chain: liquidity depth, trading-pair age, cross-chain presence, same-ticker impersonation. Covers on Ethereum, BSC and Base only: sell simulation (honeypot detection, buy/sell/transfer taxes), whether the contract is open source, and the aggregate verdicts of upstream security scanners. Covers on Solana: the mint/freeze authority, the RugCheck score, and the SPL Token-2022 extension block -- non-transferable, frozen-by-default, transfer fee (with its cap), permanent delegate, transfer hook, pausable, close authority, scaled balances and interest-bearing balances. Every other extension the report carries is named in the answer with the reason it is not scored, so silence about one means it was considered, not that it went unread. No sell simulation runs on Solana, nor on the four other EVM chains accepted as a chain_hint (polygon, arbitrum, optimism, avalanche): nothing there tests whether a holder can sell, so the answer comes back 'unknown' rather than 'low'. No holder concentration on any chain -- on EVM it needs an oracle the benchmark holds out, and on Solana the upstream omits holders. IMPORTANT: risk_level 'unknown' means a critical check could not be completed. It is NOT a low-risk result and must not be used to justify a trade; evidence.data_gaps lists exactly what was missing, and unknown_kind says whose gap it is: 'infrastructure' and 'mixed' mean an upstream of ours failed and come with next_action 'retry' and retry_after_seconds (in a 'mixed' answer the rest was worked out without that upstream, so the retry can change any of it); 'coverage' comes with 'abstain'. 'confidence' measures how complete the input data was, not how safe the token is. Reports observable on-chain risk only. Not financial advice, does not size positions, and cannot see off-chain risk such as team behaviour, social engineering, or a rug executed through governance. Treat 'low' as 'no fatal signal found in the checks that ran', never as 'safe to buy'.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • find_new_hot_poolsScan a chain for the newest and most active trading pools, returning name, token_address, price, liquidity, 24h volume and pool age.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_new_hot_pools" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scan a chain for the newest and most active trading pools, returning name, token_address, price, liquidity, 24h volume and pool age. Discovery only. New pools carry inherently high risk and appearing here is NOT a safety endorsement — pass token_address straight to assess_token_risk for anything you intend to act on.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • get_token_liquidityLiquidity snapshot for a token's primary trading pair: price, 24h volume, pair count and the chains it trades on.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_token_liquidity" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Liquidity snapshot for a token's primary trading pair: price, 24h volume, pair count and the chains it trades on. Check 'status' before using the numbers. 'ok' means usable upstream data, not independently verified reserves or executable sell depth. The optional liquidity_reserve_check marker says 'not_checkable' when a positive selected estimate has no computable reserve cap. A missing marker never asserts that reserves, prices or an exit trade were independently verified. 'unavailable' means the upstream request failed, which does NOT mean the token has no liquidity. 'not_found' means no trading pair exists for this address at all. 'unpriced' means pairs exist but no source has costed them, so liquidity_usd is null and the depth is unknown -- this is NOT a report of zero liquidity. 'drained' means every pool on the token's own chain reports its depth and every one is empty: there is nothing to sell into.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://vetagent.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including assess_token_risk (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description is 2,174 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...'low' as 'no fatal signal found in the checks that ran', never as 'safe to buy'."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http vetagent https://vetagent.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http vetagent https://vetagent.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__vetagent__get_token_liquidity",
      "mcp__vetagent__find_new_hot_pools"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__vetagent__assess_token_risk"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vetagent. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__vetagent__assess_token_risk untrusted-input
  • mcp__vetagent__get_token_liquidity untrusted-input
  • mcp__vetagent__find_new_hot_pools untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.vetagent/vetagent/verify?hash=0ad7a5353613d37893f44aa1c2b8a00a98f38015245182235a56ea359466e0ff" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0ad7a5353613, from Nov 11, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.vetagent/vetagent/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.vetagent/vetagent
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.vetagent/vetagent.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.vetagent/vetagent)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

vetagent MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the vetagent MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the vetagent MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the vetagent MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the vetagent MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. assess_token_risk, get_token_liquidity and find_new_hot_pools.

Does the vetagent MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the vetagent MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the vetagent MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.