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walkaround MCP server

dev.walkaround/walkaroundwalkaround.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Launch check for AI-built apps: SAFE or DO NOT SHIP verdict, with evidence and paste-back fixes.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the walkaround MCP server can do

The walkaround MCP server is published by walkaround.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_app), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_app and get_receipt); 1 tool can send data out of your system (scan_app).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint asks for sign-in.

Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • scan_appRun twelve deterministic checks against the outside of a public web app and return a dated verdict: the stamp, the open/closed/not-checked counts, every line with its plain-English…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run twelve deterministic checks against the outside of a public web app and return a dated verdict: the stamp, the open/closed/not-checked counts, every line with its plain-English consequence, what was skipped, and the receipt id and URL. Free, no token. It reads public pages only: it does not sign in, does not create an account and does not guess anything. A clean verdict is not a guarantee of safety.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_receiptRead a receipt back as JSON by its id.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a receipt back as JSON by its id. Folded, it returns the twelve lines and a pay object naming where a human pays. With a bearer token that has credit it unseals: the evidence and the fix paragraph for every open line, and the SOTA Security Model read of the app. One fixed price per unsealed report. 401 for a token we did not issue, 402 when the balance will not cover it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
401
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
no
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint asks for credentials (HTTP 401) but publishes no RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: no resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate and no document at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.

    Matched text

    https://walkaround.dev/mcp: initialize answered HTTP 401, without a WWW-Authenticate header

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 401; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 0 (and 2 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 401
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: not observed to no

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http walkaround https://walkaround.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http walkaround https://walkaround.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__walkaround__get_receipt"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__walkaround__scan_app"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as walkaround. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__walkaround__scan_app untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__walkaround__get_receipt untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.walkaround/walkaround/verify?hash=d77d666bbeb6d1dd45c0cfc775590c97a26fdb132dc3157aac3cde97059e78dc" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d77d666bbeb6, from Oct 21, 2026, 18:59 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.walkaround/walkaround/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.walkaround/walkaround
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.walkaround/walkaround.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.walkaround/walkaround)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

walkaround MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the walkaround MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the walkaround MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the walkaround MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the walkaround MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. scan_app and get_receipt.

Does the walkaround MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Yes. Its remote endpoint answered 401 without credentials, and no OAuth protected resource metadata was found.

Does the walkaround MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_app.

Has the walkaround MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.