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Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server

dev.wiscolabs/developer-toolswiscolabs.devstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Check PyPI and npm upgrades: known vulnerabilities, the safe version, and what each upgrade breaks.

9 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 8 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server can do

The Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server is published by wiscolabs.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (what_changed) and create or change data (8 tools: vulnerabilities, upgrade_check, peer_check, wheel_check and 4 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool can send data out of your system (what_changed).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • what_changedWhat breaks, gets removed, is deprecated, or gains a security fix when upgrading one package between two versions, with an overall upgrade risk.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "what_changed" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What breaks, gets removed, is deprecated, or gains a security fix when upgrading one package between two versions, with an overall upgrade risk.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • native_checkBefore building on Alpine, Linux ARM, Windows ARM, a Mac or Lambda, checks which npm dependencies contain native code and whether a prebuilt binary exists for the target platform.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before building on Alpine, Linux ARM, Windows ARM, a Mac or Lambda, checks which npm dependencies contain native code and whether a prebuilt binary exists for the target platform. For those that would compile from source (needing a C/C++ toolchain and Python) or fail, gives the nearest newer version that ships a prebuilt for that platform, with that upgrade's risk.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • node_checkBefore moving a project to a new Node.js version (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before moving a project to a new Node.js version (e.g. off Node 20 to 22 or 24), checks each npm dependency's declared Node support (its engines field). For each that doesn't support the target, gives the smallest newer release that does, with that upgrade's risk. Works from a package-lock.json without installing anything.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • package_infoLatest and latest stable version, repository, release count, and where its release notes come from.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Latest and latest stable version, repository, release count, and where its release notes come from.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • peer_checkBefore upgrading a core npm package (react, typescript, eslint, vite...), checks every dependency in the project that declares it as a peer dependency: does the installed version a…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before upgrading a core npm package (react, typescript, eslint, vite...), checks every dependency in the project that declares it as a peer dependency: does the installed version accept the new version, and if not, the smallest release that does, with that upgrade's risk. Also checks the new version's own peer requirements against what's installed. Answers the questions behind npm's ERESOLVE errors without running npm.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • types_checkFor a TypeScript project: which dependencies ship their own type declarations, which need a DefinitelyTyped @types package (and the version that matches the installed library), and…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "types_check" says "type": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "types_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "types_check" says "type": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For a TypeScript project: which dependencies ship their own type declarations, which need a DefinitelyTyped @types package (and the version that matches the installed library), and which installed @types packages describe a different major version than the library.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • upgrade_checkGive it a project's dependencies: a requirements.txt or pip freeze output for Python, or a package-lock.json, package.json, or name@version lines for npm.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Give it a project's dependencies: a requirements.txt or pip freeze output for Python, or a package-lock.json, package.json, or name@version lines for npm. Flags malicious packages and versions with known vulnerabilities (with the smallest safe version to move to, preferring a low-risk patch), then reports what each upgrade breaks, removes, or deprecates, ranked into remove_now / fix_now / no_fix_available / upgrade_first / safe / review / needs_care.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • vulnerabilitiesIs this exact version of a package affected by known security advisories?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Is this exact version of a package affected by known security advisories? Returns each vulnerability (with CVE ids and severity), the versions that fix it, and the smallest safe upgrade.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • wheel_checkFor each pinned Python package, whether a prebuilt wheel exists for a target Python version and platform (Windows ARM, Alpine/musl, Linux ARM, macOS, a new Python version).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For each pinned Python package, whether a prebuilt wheel exists for a target Python version and platform (Windows ARM, Alpine/musl, Linux ARM, macOS, a new Python version). Without one, pip builds from source, which usually fails without a compiler for packages with C extensions. For each that's missing, gives the nearest newer version that has a wheel, with that upgrade's risk.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.wiscolabs.dev/mcp/dev: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including what_changed (irreversible), vulnerabilities (write), upgrade_check (write), peer_check (write), wheel_check (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "what_changed" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "types_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "types_check" says "type": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http developer-tools https://api.wiscolabs.dev/mcp/dev
claude mcp add --transport http developer-tools https://api.wiscolabs.dev/mcp/dev

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__developer-tools__vulnerabilities",
      "mcp__developer-tools__upgrade_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__what_changed",
      "mcp__developer-tools__peer_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__wheel_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__node_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__native_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__types_check",
      "mcp__developer-tools__package_info"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as developer-tools. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__developer-tools__what_changed outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.wiscolabs/developer-tools/verify?hash=77c0c6dd6b20e80871821d5bff9ef754036381c7331022078086135a3c6b8a55" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 77c0c6dd6b20, from Nov 18, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.wiscolabs/developer-tools/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.wiscolabs/developer-tools
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.wiscolabs/developer-tools.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.wiscolabs/developer-tools)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 22:17 UTC.

Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: what_changed.

What tools does the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server have?

9 tools: 1 irreversible, 8 write. what_changed, vulnerabilities, upgrade_check, peer_check, wheel_check, node_check, native_check, types_check and 1 more.

Does the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): what_changed.

Has the Wisco Labs: developer tools MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.