PageText MCP server
dev.workers.apexlabs-cloudflare.pagetext/pagetextpagetext.apexlabs-cloudflare.workers.devstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Convert a web page or HTML into clean readable Markdown for LLM context. $0.005 USDC via x402.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the PageText MCP server can do
The PageText MCP server is published by pagetext.apexlabs-cloudflare.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: convert_url_to_text and html_to_text), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (convert_url_to_text).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
convert_url_to_textFetch a public web page by URL and extract clean, readable Markdown for LLM context.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "convert_url_to_text" says "convert": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a public web page by URL and extract clean, readable Markdown for LLM context. Strips scripts, navigation, footers, and chrome. Does not run JavaScript or load a browser. Costs $0.005 USDC on Base, paid with x402.
html_to_textConvert raw HTML into clean, readable Markdown for LLM context.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Convert raw HTML into clean, readable Markdown for LLM context. Strips scripts, navigation, footers, and chrome. Costs $0.005 USDC on Base, paid with x402.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://pagetext.apexlabs-cloudflare.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including convert_url_to_text (write), html_to_text (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http pagetext https://pagetext.apexlabs-cloudflare.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http pagetext https://pagetext.apexlabs-cloudflare.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__pagetext__convert_url_to_text",
"mcp__pagetext__html_to_text"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pagetext. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__pagetext__convert_url_to_text outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.apexlabs-cloudflare.pagetext/pagetext/verify?hash=dbef0fc928f257b29181753ca62ada5d203a8f12c237c3066c5c013b133bd290" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash dbef0fc928f2, from Nov 16, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.apexlabs-cloudflare.pagetext/pagetext/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.apexlabs-cloudflare.pagetext/pagetext)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
PageText MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the PageText MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the PageText MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the PageText MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the PageText MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. convert_url_to_text and html_to_text.
Does the PageText MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the PageText MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): convert_url_to_text.
Has the PageText MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.