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Datoka Agent MCP server

dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agentdatoka-agent.bhazarstudio.workers.devstreamable-httpv0.8.4Scanned

Signed agent execution declarations. Free verification; issuance 0.002 USDC via x402 on Base.

5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Datoka Agent MCP server can do

The Datoka Agent MCP server is published by datoka-agent.bhazarstudio.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: verify_proof_receipt, prepare_agent_event, issue_agent_receipt and verify_agent_receipt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (issue_agent_receipt).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.8.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • issue_agent_receiptPersist a signed execution declaration receipt.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Persist a signed execution declaration receipt. Public price: 0.002 USDC via x402 on the advertised network. Preserve event, idempotencyKey and payment authorization on retries. Signed declarations do not independently prove execution.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • prepare_agent_eventFree validation of a locally built execution declaration before issuance.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free validation of a locally built execution declaration before issuance. Hash exact input and output bytes locally; supply identifiers and UTC timestamps with milliseconds. Returns the validated event, commitment and logical chain without creating or purchasing a receipt. Use issue_agent_receipt only if a portable signed declaration is needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_agent_receiptFree verification of an execution event and its unchanged receipt returned by issue_agent_receipt.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free verification of an execution event and its unchanged receipt returned by issue_agent_receipt. Checks signature, scope and event commitment against this issuer. No wallet or new issuance required. Use verify_proof_receipt for the distinct common proof-envelope format. A valid signature does not independently prove execution; compare original bytes locally.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_proof_receiptFree verification of a common Datoka proof against an independently obtained caller-supplied public trust registry and explicit issuer/scope/chain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free verification of a common Datoka proof against an independently obtained caller-supplied public trust registry and explicit issuer/scope/chain. Send only the proof, never raw documents. receiptVerified concerns signature, context and dates; status remains incomplete because the artifact is checked locally. No payment, factual accuracy or parent signatures are verified.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_agent_public_keysReturn public keys of this issuer.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_public_keys" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return public keys of this issuer. The operator must establish trust in this issuer independently.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://datoka-agent.bhazarstudio.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_proof_receipt (write), prepare_agent_event (write), issue_agent_receipt (write), verify_agent_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.8.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent https://datoka-agent.bhazarstudio.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent https://datoka-agent.bhazarstudio.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent__get_agent_public_keys"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent__verify_proof_receipt",
      "mcp__agent__prepare_agent_event",
      "mcp__agent__issue_agent_receipt",
      "mcp__agent__verify_agent_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agent__issue_agent_receipt untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agent/verify?hash=619cdefbc174d4dc04aecf5035c326d042448bca3780d202d22d094341dd70b1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 619cdefbc174, from Nov 15, 2026, 04:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agent/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agent
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agent.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.bhazarstudio.datoka-agent/agent)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

Datoka Agent MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Datoka Agent MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Datoka Agent MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Datoka Agent MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Datoka Agent MCP server have?

5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. verify_proof_receipt, prepare_agent_event, issue_agent_receipt, verify_agent_receipt and get_agent_public_keys.

Does the Datoka Agent MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Datoka Agent MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Datoka Agent MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.