Insidewell MCP server
dev.workers.cybermax-tools.cybermax/insidewell-apicybermax.cybermax-tools.workers.devstreamable-httpv1.1.2Scanned
Insider trading API + MCP: SEC Form 4 buys/sells, cluster buys. Keys $19/mo; 100 free/day.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Insidewell MCP server can do
The Insidewell MCP server is published by cybermax.cybermax-tools.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (insider_trades) and create or change data (1 tool: cluster_buys), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (insider_trades, cluster_buys and data_status); 1 tool can send data out of your system (insider_trades).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.1.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
insider_tradesLatest insider transactions from SEC Form 4 filings (EDGAR, refreshed about once a minute), newest filed first, up to 100 rows: ticker, insider, role, code (P buy, S sale, ...), sh…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "insider_trades" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Latest insider transactions from SEC Form 4 filings (EDGAR, refreshed about once a minute), newest filed first, up to 100 rows: ticker, insider, role, code (P buy, S sale, ...), shares, price, dollar value, dates and the filing link. Defaults to open-market buys and sales filed in the last 7 days.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
cluster_buysCompanies where 2+ different insiders bought the stock on the open market within 7 days (window, minimum insiders and minimum dollars adjustable), with each insider, total dollars …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Companies where 2+ different insiders bought the stock on the open market within 7 days (window, minimum insiders and minimum dollars adjustable), with each insider, total dollars and filing links.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
data_statusWhen Insidewell last pulled new Form 4 filings from EDGAR and which filed dates it covers.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "data_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it When Insidewell last pulled new Form 4 filings from EDGAR and which filed dates it covers.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://insidewell-api.cybermaxtools.com/mcp?via=mcp-registry: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including insider_trades (irreversible), cluster_buys (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warninsider_trades
The server marks "insider_trades" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http insidewell-api https://insidewell-api.cybermaxtools.com/mcp?via=mcp-registryclaude mcp add --transport http insidewell-api https://insidewell-api.cybermaxtools.com/mcp?via=mcp-registryRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__insidewell-api__data_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__insidewell-api__insider_trades",
"mcp__insidewell-api__cluster_buys"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as insidewell-api. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__insidewell-api__insider_trades untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__insidewell-api__cluster_buys untrusted-input
- mcp__insidewell-api__data_status untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.cybermax-tools.cybermax/insidewell-api/verify?hash=7c8e773ef1e46499e76d806539b4f87dba9091217c291cc4e0b0d4652550384c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7c8e773ef1e4, from Nov 17, 2026, 17:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.cybermax-tools.cybermax/insidewell-api/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.cybermax-tools.cybermax/insidewell-api)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
Insidewell MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Insidewell MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Insidewell MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Insidewell MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: insider_trades.
What tools does the Insidewell MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. insider_trades, cluster_buys and data_status.
Does the Insidewell MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Insidewell MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): insider_trades.
Has the Insidewell MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.