Igris Solana token safety MCP server
dev.workers.igris-bot.token-safety/solana-token-safetytoken-safety.igris-bot.workers.devstreamable-httpv2.1.0Scanned
Solana token rug/honeypot checks: free quick check; full score paid via x402 (USDC Solana/Base).
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Igris Solana token safety MCP server can do
The Igris Solana token safety MCP server is published by token-safety.igris-bot.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: solana_token_quick_check, solana_token_safety and solana_token_safety_batch), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (solana_token_quick_check, solana_token_safety and solana_token_safety_batch).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 2.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
solana_token_quick_checkFREE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE. On-chain check of a Solana SPL mint: mint authority, freeze authority, risky Token-2022 extensions. Returns risk score 0-100 (higher=riskier). For holder concentration, rugcheck flags and honeypot (sell-back) test use solana_token_safety.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
solana_token_safetyPAID 0.01 USDC (x402, Solana or Base; pay via _meta['x402/payment']).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID 0.01 USDC (x402, Solana or Base; pay via _meta['x402/payment']). Full rug/honeypot risk score for a Solana SPL mint: authorities, Token-2022 extensions, top-10 holder concentration excluding pools, rugcheck danger flags, and a live Jupiter $25 buy+sell round-trip cost. Use before swapping into an unknown token.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
solana_token_safety_batchPAID 0.05 USDC (x402, Solana or Base).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID 0.05 USDC (x402, Solana or Base). Full risk score for up to 10 Solana mints in one call (half the per-token price).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://token-safety.igris-bot.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including solana_token_quick_check (write), solana_token_safety (write), solana_token_safety_batch (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http solana-token-safety https://token-safety.igris-bot.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http solana-token-safety https://token-safety.igris-bot.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_quick_check",
"mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_safety",
"mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_safety_batch"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as solana-token-safety. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_quick_check untrusted-input
- mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_safety untrusted-input
- mcp__solana-token-safety__solana_token_safety_batch untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.igris-bot.token-safety/solana-token-safety/verify?hash=2a016145cc259d2da34139f9cbdc5fd1a3003ac8ae90da5779f24731a9bfaca6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2a016145cc25, from Nov 15, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.igris-bot.token-safety/solana-token-safety/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.igris-bot.token-safety/solana-token-safety)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
Igris Solana token safety MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Igris Solana token safety MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Igris Solana token safety MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Igris Solana token safety MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Igris Solana token safety MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. solana_token_quick_check, solana_token_safety and solana_token_safety_batch.
Does the Igris Solana token safety MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Igris Solana token safety MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Igris Solana token safety MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.