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GlyphGuard MCP server

dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguardglyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.devstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Find hidden Unicode (zero-width, bidi, tag payloads), homoglyphs and lookalike names in text.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the GlyphGuard MCP server can do

The GlyphGuard MCP server is published by glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • clean_textReturn the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces. By default ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 are kept inside emoji sequences, between letters of joining scripts (Arabic, Persian) and after an Indic virama (keep_joiners=true); strict=true removes them everywhere. Optional: map lookalike letters to Latin (lookalikes) and apply NFKC normalisation (nfkc). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/clean.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Clean hidden Unicode
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • compare_namesCheck whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names (for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"), using a UTS #39-style …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "compare_names" says "compare": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names (for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"), using a UTS #39-style confusable skeleton (curated subset, case and accents ignored). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/compare.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Compare names for lookalikes
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • scan_textFind invisible characters, bidi controls (Trojan Source), hidden Unicode tag payloads (decoded), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find invisible characters, bidi controls (Trojan Source), hidden Unicode tag payloads (decoded), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and lookalike letters. ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 in legitimate context (emoji sequences, Persian/Arabic joining, Indic virama) are reported as info joiner_in_context and do not raise risk; elsewhere they stay medium. Lone surrogates are flagged. Returns a risk level (none/low/medium/high), counts, and findings with UTF-16 offsets and code points. Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/scan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scan text for hidden Unicode
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http glyphguard https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http glyphguard https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__glyphguard__scan_text",
      "mcp__glyphguard__clean_text",
      "mcp__glyphguard__compare_names"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as glyphguard. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard/verify?hash=9ba1cea3955cdd20f5ae127ae61748cabab70f8e1d39d44ea71dafbeacd8b863" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9ba1cea3955c, from Nov 8, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 09:17 UTC.

GlyphGuard MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the GlyphGuard MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the GlyphGuard MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the GlyphGuard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the GlyphGuard MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. scan_text, clean_text and compare_names.

Does the GlyphGuard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the GlyphGuard MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the GlyphGuard MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.