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Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server

dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contractpenny-surface-contract.penny-mcamp.workers.devstreamable-httpv2026.10.22Scanned

Surface contracts: API behavior evidence, x402 pre-payment check, MCP server preflight

7 tools: 4 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 3 findings, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server can do

The Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server is published by penny-surface-contract.penny-mcamp.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: verify_surface, contribute_discrepancy, preflight_mcp_server and prepay_check), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

2 tools can send data out of your system (preflight_mcp_server and prepay_check).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 2026.10.22.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • contribute_discrepancyReport a platform behaviour that contradicts a published claim, or a new claim, with evidence.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.statement), which can change anything it can reach.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a platform behaviour that contradicts a published claim, or a new claim, with evidence. One-line call: POST /v1/contribute with {contractId, kind, statement, evidence[], reporter, observedAt}. Stored as pending; a published contract is never changed without independent verification. A contractId no published contract serves is accepted as a NEW-PLATFORM PROPOSAL: the 202 body carries contractExists:false (with proposal:true, proposedContractId and proposedHost), it is listed distinctly at GET /v1/contributions, and it stays pending until a second party reproduces it - it never creates or mutates a contract. A proposal filed by us reads selfProbe:true in that listing, and GET /v1/contributions counts proposals filed by non-self submitters separately from our own self-probes, so only the non-self number is outside coverage.
  • preflight_mcp_serverRun the anonymous MCP handshake against ANY https MCP endpoint you name, right now, and get back a verdict (open / refused / unreachable / initialize-transport-error), the shape of…Can send data out2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to "mcp.json".

      Matched text

      description: "...Pass `urls` (up to 5) to check a whole mcp.json in one call. When the endpoint refuses,..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...eports whether the refusal advertises a credential path (an RFC 9728 resource_metadata poi..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run the anonymous MCP handshake against ANY https MCP endpoint you name, right now, and get back a verdict (open / refused / unreachable / initialize-transport-error), the shape of any refusal body, whether the server is stateful (sets Mcp-Session-Id), how many tools tools/list returns, and the guard clauses that follow. Use it before wiring an MCP server into your own config. Pass `urls` (up to 5) to check a whole mcp.json in one call. When the endpoint refuses, it also reports whether the refusal advertises a credential path (an RFC 9728 resource_metadata pointer) and whether that pointer resolves to a metadata document naming an authorization server, so you learn where a token would come from without writing that parsing yourself. No credential is sent, none is obtained, and none of their tools is ever called.
  • prepay_checkCheck an x402 route BEFORE you pay it.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...npaid GET with no payment header and no credential, and returns one row: the measured HTTP..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an x402 route BEFORE you pay it. GET /v1/prepay?url=<the route> makes ONE unpaid GET with no payment header and no credential, and returns one row: the measured HTTP status, the parsed x402 v2 challenge (scheme / network / asset / amount / payTo), whether that challenge is schema-valid exact-on-Base, and whether its payTo and price agree with the seller's own card (pass `card` to read that card with one more unpaid GET). No payment is made, no credential is sent, no redirect is followed, and a transport failure on our side is reported as unknown rather than as a fact about the seller. Use it to gate a payment decision on measured terms instead of on a seller's prose.
  • verify_surfaceRun the anonymous conformance checks for a contract now and return verified / failed / unknown / manual / unsupported per claim.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run the anonymous conformance checks for a contract now and return verified / failed / unknown / manual / unsupported per claim.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_integration_recipeGet a plain-text integration recipe for a platform: the order of operations to use it, and a guard clause for every behaviour we measured going wrong, each naming the contract clai…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_integration_recipe" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a plain-text integration recipe for a platform: the order of operations to use it, and a guard clause for every behaviour we measured going wrong, each naming the contract claim behind it. Derived from the contract, so it cannot drift from it.
  • get_surface_contractGet the machine-readable surface contract for a platform host (read/write semantics, pending states, rate limits, limits, idempotency, pagination completeness, data portability), e…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_surface_contract" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the machine-readable surface contract for a platform host (read/write semantics, pending states, rate limits, limits, idempotency, pagination completeness, data portability), each claim carrying its evidence and its verification status.
  • list_surface_contractsList the platform surface contracts published in Penny's free registry, with claim counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_surface_contracts" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the platform surface contracts published in Penny's free registry, with claim counts.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://penny-surface-contract.penny-mcamp.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_surface (write), contribute_discrepancy (write), preflight_mcp_server (write), prepay_check (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high2 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 2026.10.22. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http surface-contract https://penny-surface-contract.penny-mcamp.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http surface-contract https://penny-surface-contract.penny-mcamp.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__surface-contract__list_surface_contracts",
      "mcp__surface-contract__get_surface_contract",
      "mcp__surface-contract__get_integration_recipe"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__surface-contract__verify_surface",
      "mcp__surface-contract__contribute_discrepancy",
      "mcp__surface-contract__preflight_mcp_server",
      "mcp__surface-contract__prepay_check"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as surface-contract. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__surface-contract__preflight_mcp_server outbound
  • mcp__surface-contract__prepay_check outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contract/verify?hash=bfce0f5a873f3196bb37ad4b1e22c64b536469bcd2076c543a06a1edd1cdc56d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bfce0f5a873f, from Nov 8, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contract/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contract
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contract.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.penny-mcamp.penny-surface-contract/surface-contract)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server have?

7 tools: 4 write, 3 read. verify_surface, contribute_discrepancy, preflight_mcp_server, prepay_check, list_surface_contracts, get_surface_contract and get_integration_recipe.

Does the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): preflight_mcp_server and prepay_check.

Has the Surface Contract: platform API behavior and x402 pre-payment checks MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.