Token Safety (Base) MCP server
dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safetytoken-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.devstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Base token safety: one-call verdict, risk score, rug check, holders, momentum. x402 + free demo.
5 tools: 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Token Safety (Base) MCP server can do
The Token Safety (Base) MCP server is published by token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check, holder_check and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
holder_checkPAUSED: holder_check answers paused without asking for payment and is never charged (its top-holder source was a third-party API we no longer use).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it PAUSED: holder_check answers paused without asking for payment and is never charged (its top-holder source was a third-party API we no longer use). For holder concentration use token_risk (holder_concentration).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
momentum_scoreMomentum score 0-100 for an ERC-20 on Base from 24 h volume, volume vs liquidity and price change, with confidence low/medium/high.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Momentum score 0-100 for an ERC-20 on Base from 24 h volume, volume vs liquidity and price change, with confidence low/medium/high. Null for stablecoins. Use to rank Base tokens by activity. $0.02 via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rug_checkRug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base: rug_pull true/false, confidence and 5 signals (liquidity removal, wash trading, LP lock, owner wallet, sell tax from our own sell simulation).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Rug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base: rug_pull true/false, confidence and 5 signals (liquidity removal, wash trading, LP lock, owner wallet, sell tax from our own sell simulation). Use before buying a new Base token. $0.02 via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
token_riskRisk score 0-100 (higher = riskier) for an ERC-20 on Base: derived liquidity view, holder concentration, sell-blocked/tax flags from our own on-chain sell simulation.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Risk score 0-100 (higher = riskier) for an ERC-20 on Base: derived liquidity view, holder concentration, sell-blocked/tax flags from our own on-chain sell simulation. Use before buying or listing an unknown Base token. $0.01 via x402. Not investment advice.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
token_verdictOne-call verdict for an ERC-20 on Base: runs token risk (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it One-call verdict for an ERC-20 on Base: runs token risk (incl. holder concentration), rug-pull and momentum checks plus contract flags (proxy, blacklist, pause, selfdestruct, own on-chain sell simulation) and returns avoid / high_risk / caution / low_risk with a one-line English summary. Use once before buying or listing an unknown Base token. $0.01 via x402. Not investment advice.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including token_verdict (write), token_risk (write), rug_check (write), holder_check (write), momentum_score (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 5
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:holder_checkChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:momentum_scoreChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:rug_checkChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:token_riskChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:token_verdictChanges thingsannotations
Tools1 removed, 5 changed.−1 removed~5 changedView diff
- Removed:token_safety_demo
- Changed:holder_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:momentum_scoreChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:rug_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:token_riskChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:token_verdictChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 5.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 5
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http token-safety https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http token-safety https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__token-safety__token_verdict",
"mcp__token-safety__token_risk",
"mcp__token-safety__rug_check",
"mcp__token-safety__holder_check",
"mcp__token-safety__momentum_score"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as token-safety. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__token-safety__token_verdict untrusted-input
- mcp__token-safety__token_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__token-safety__rug_check untrusted-input
- mcp__token-safety__holder_check untrusted-input
- mcp__token-safety__momentum_score untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety/verify?hash=23e7e69fbe4430a311c05d8d64d2a48c978104ef5097c7dbdf7ef691dd1f186d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 23e7e69fbe44, from Nov 15, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.
Token Safety (Base) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Token Safety (Base) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Token Safety (Base) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Token Safety (Base) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 write. token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check, holder_check and momentum_score.
Does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Token Safety (Base) MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 15, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.