Skip to content

Token Safety (Base) MCP server

dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safetytoken-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.devstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Base token safety: one-call verdict, risk score, rug check, holders, momentum. x402 + free demo.

5 tools: 5 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Token Safety (Base) MCP server can do

The Token Safety (Base) MCP server is published by token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check, holder_check and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check and 2 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • holder_checkPAUSED: holder_check answers paused without asking for payment and is never charged (its top-holder source was a third-party API we no longer use).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAUSED: holder_check answers paused without asking for payment and is never charged (its top-holder source was a third-party API we no longer use). For holder concentration use token_risk (holder_concentration).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • momentum_scoreMomentum score 0-100 for an ERC-20 on Base from 24 h volume, volume vs liquidity and price change, with confidence low/medium/high.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Momentum score 0-100 for an ERC-20 on Base from 24 h volume, volume vs liquidity and price change, with confidence low/medium/high. Null for stablecoins. Use to rank Base tokens by activity. $0.02 via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • rug_checkRug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base: rug_pull true/false, confidence and 5 signals (liquidity removal, wash trading, LP lock, owner wallet, sell tax from our own sell simulation).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Rug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base: rug_pull true/false, confidence and 5 signals (liquidity removal, wash trading, LP lock, owner wallet, sell tax from our own sell simulation). Use before buying a new Base token. $0.02 via x402.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_riskRisk score 0-100 (higher = riskier) for an ERC-20 on Base: derived liquidity view, holder concentration, sell-blocked/tax flags from our own on-chain sell simulation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Risk score 0-100 (higher = riskier) for an ERC-20 on Base: derived liquidity view, holder concentration, sell-blocked/tax flags from our own on-chain sell simulation. Use before buying or listing an unknown Base token. $0.01 via x402. Not investment advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_verdictOne-call verdict for an ERC-20 on Base: runs token risk (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-call verdict for an ERC-20 on Base: runs token risk (incl. holder concentration), rug-pull and momentum checks plus contract flags (proxy, blacklist, pause, selfdestruct, own on-chain sell simulation) and returns avoid / high_risk / caution / low_risk with a one-line English summary. Use once before buying or listing an unknown Base token. $0.01 via x402. Not investment advice.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including token_verdict (write), token_risk (write), rug_check (write), holder_check (write), momentum_score (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 5

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  2. Tools1 removed, 5 changed.−1 removed~5 changedView diff
    • Removed:token_safety_demo
    • Changed:holder_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:momentum_scoreChanges thingsinputSchema
    • Changed:rug_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:token_riskChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:token_verdictChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 5.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 5

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http token-safety https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http token-safety https://token-safety-mcp.restockalarm.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__token-safety__token_verdict",
      "mcp__token-safety__token_risk",
      "mcp__token-safety__rug_check",
      "mcp__token-safety__holder_check",
      "mcp__token-safety__momentum_score"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as token-safety. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__token-safety__token_verdict untrusted-input
  • mcp__token-safety__token_risk untrusted-input
  • mcp__token-safety__rug_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__token-safety__holder_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__token-safety__momentum_score untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety/verify?hash=23e7e69fbe4430a311c05d8d64d2a48c978104ef5097c7dbdf7ef691dd1f186d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 23e7e69fbe44, from Nov 15, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.restockalarm.token-safety-mcp/token-safety)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

Token Safety (Base) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Token Safety (Base) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Token Safety (Base) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Token Safety (Base) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server have?

5 tools: 5 write. token_verdict, token_risk, rug_check, holder_check and momentum_score.

Does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Token Safety (Base) MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Token Safety (Base) MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 15, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.