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Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server

dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflightsdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.devstreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

$0.01/call via x402: OFAC wallet screen, DNS, email auth, domain age, email verify, URL unshorten.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server can do

The Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server is published by sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: ofac_wallet_screen, email_auth_check, whois_domain_age, email_mx_verify and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (ofac_wallet_screen, dns_lookup, email_auth_check and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (url_unshorten).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • email_auth_checkChecks a domain's email authentication: parses SPF (+all, ?all, multiple records, over 10 DNS lookups), DMARC (p, sp, pct, rua), DKIM keys (your selector or 15 common ones) and MX,…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks a domain's email authentication: parses SPF (+all, ?all, multiple records, over 10 DNS lookups), DMARC (p, sp, pct, rua), DKIM keys (your selector or 15 common ones) and MX, then returns an A-F grade, 0-100 score and coded issues (spf_missing, dmarc_p_none, ...). Use when an agent must judge if a domain can be spoofed, debug deliverability, or vet a sender/vendor domain. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Email Auth Check (SPF/DMARC/DKIM)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • email_mx_verifyChecks an email address without sending mail or opening SMTP: syntax, domain exists, MX records (or RFC 5321 A/AAAA fallback), RFC 7505 null MX, MX host resolves, disposable-domain…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks an email address without sending mail or opening SMTP: syntax, domain exists, MX records (or RFC 5321 A/AAAA fallback), RFC 7505 null MX, MX host resolves, disposable-domain list (~9.9k domains), role account (info@, support@) and free provider. Verdict deliverable_domain, risky, undeliverable or unknown. Cannot prove the mailbox itself exists. Use when an agent validates a signup, lead or contact email before using it. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Email Address Verify (MX, no SMTP)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • ofac_wallet_screenScreens a crypto wallet address (EVM, BTC, TRON, SOL, XMR and every other chain OFAC lists) against all Digital Currency Addresses on the US Treasury OFAC SDN list.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screens a crypto wallet address (EVM, BTC, TRON, SOL, XMR and every other chain OFAC lists) against all Digital Currency Addresses on the US Treasury OFAC SDN list. Returns sanctioned true/false, verdict block/no_match, SDN entity name, sdnType, programs and the list publish date. Use when an agent is about to send funds to, pay, or accept funds from an unfamiliar wallet. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: OFAC SDN Wallet Screen
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • url_unshortenFollows a URL's HTTP redirects hop by hop (max 10, page bodies never read) and returns the final URL, status, the full chain and heuristic safety flags: shortener_used, cross_domai…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Follows a URL's HTTP redirects hop by hop (max 10, page bodies never read) and returns the final URL, status, the full chain and heuristic safety flags: shortener_used, cross_domain_redirect, https_downgrade, ip_address_host, punycode_host, userinfo_in_url, high_abuse_tld, credential_keyword_after_redirect, loops. Risk low/medium/high. Use before an agent clicks, fetches or forwards an unfamiliar or shortened link. Not a malware-reputation lookup. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: URL Unshorten & Redirect Check
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • whois_domain_ageLooks up a domain in its registry's RDAP server (the ICANN successor to WHOIS, found via the IANA bootstrap): registration date, age in days/years, newlyRegistered (<30 days), expi…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Looks up a domain in its registry's RDAP server (the ICANN successor to WHOIS, found via the IANA bootstrap): registration date, age in days/years, newlyRegistered (<30 days), expiry, last change, registrar name + IANA ID, EPP status, nameservers and DNSSEC. No personal contact data. Use when an agent must judge if a domain, sender or vendor is brand-new (a phishing/fraud signal). Unsupported TLDs return 400, uncharged. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Domain Age & Registrar (RDAP)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • dns_lookupResolves live DNS records for any domain or hostname via 1.1.1.1: A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA and CAA in one call (type=ALL), or a single type incl.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "dns_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolves live DNS records for any domain or hostname via 1.1.1.1: A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA and CAA in one call (type=ALL), or a single type incl. SRV, PTR, DS, DNSKEY, HTTPS. Clean JSON with TTLs, NXDOMAIN flag and DNSSEC-authenticated bit. A URL or email address is reduced to its host. Use when an agent needs to verify a domain, find mail servers or nameservers, or read TXT/SPF records. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: DNS Records Lookup
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including ofac_wallet_screen (write), email_auth_check (write), whois_domain_age (write), email_mx_verify (write), url_unshorten (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-preflight https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-preflight https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-preflight__dns_lookup"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-preflight__ofac_wallet_screen",
      "mcp__agent-preflight__email_auth_check",
      "mcp__agent-preflight__whois_domain_age",
      "mcp__agent-preflight__email_mx_verify",
      "mcp__agent-preflight__url_unshorten"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-preflight. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__agent-preflight__ofac_wallet_screen untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-preflight__dns_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-preflight__email_auth_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-preflight__whois_domain_age untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-preflight__email_mx_verify untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-preflight__url_unshorten untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight/verify?hash=043ca31637ef7b116b1961b5dda214646047a367763da420bf7c8239e1e0b9ab" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 043ca31637ef, from Nov 15, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. ofac_wallet_screen, email_auth_check, whois_domain_age, email_mx_verify, url_unshorten and dns_lookup.

Does the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): url_unshorten.

Has the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.