Skip to content

blog MCP server

es.atareao/blogatareao.esstreamable-httpv1.22.0Scanned

Consulta de solo lectura del contenido de atareao.es: podcast, tutoriales y software.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

Run the operations that matter as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

Its sign-in does not let Anlyon set up an OAuth client on its own, so there is no link to it here.

What the blog MCP server can do

The blog MCP server is published by atareao.es, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_latest_posts, get_post and search_posts).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.22.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_latest_postsDevuelve las últimas entradas publicadas y públicas del blog (solo lectura).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_latest_posts" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_latest_posts" says "get" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Devuelve las últimas entradas publicadas y públicas del blog (solo lectura).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • untrustedContentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • get_postDevuelve una entrada publicada y pública por su ID (solo lectura).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_post" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_post" says "get" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Devuelve una entrada publicada y pública por su ID (solo lectura).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • untrustedContentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • search_postsBusca entradas publicadas y públicas por texto (solo lectura).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_posts" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "search_posts" says "search" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Busca entradas publicadas y públicas por texto (solo lectura).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • untrustedContentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 31, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://atareao.es/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://pocketid.atareao.es
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
no

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.22.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http blog https://atareao.es/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http blog https://atareao.es/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__blog__get_latest_posts",
      "mcp__blog__get_post",
      "mcp__blog__search_posts"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as blog. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__blog__get_latest_posts untrusted-input
  • mcp__blog__get_post untrusted-input
  • mcp__blog__search_posts untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/es.atareao/blog/verify?hash=e3d262a1915b63c95a2d3f2e1f70b3c52d565a139d61f4508b6d250b90c89222" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e3d262a1915b, from Nov 13, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/es.atareao/blog/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for es.atareao/blog
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/es.atareao/blog.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/es.atareao/blog)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

blog MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the blog MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the blog MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the blog MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the blog MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. get_latest_posts, get_post and search_posts.

Does the blog MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the blog MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the blog MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.