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portfolio-mcp server

eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcpmmatinca.eustreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Marian Matinca's portfolio as MCP tools: projects, blog, profile, results. Read-only, RO+EN.

6 tools: 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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What the portfolio-mcp server can do

The portfolio-mcp server is published by mmatinca.eu, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (portfolio_list_blog_posts and portfolio_get_blog_post).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • portfolio_get_blog_postThe full content (markdown) of one article by slug.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "portfolio_get_blog_post" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "portfolio_get_blog_post" says "get" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The full content (markdown) of one article by slug.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One full blog article
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • portfolio_get_profileWho Marian Matinca is: career history (roles at Weco-Travel Romania), certifications and the measurable results of his projects.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "portfolio_get_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Who Marian Matinca is: career history (roles at Weco-Travel Romania), certifications and the measurable results of his projects. Same data as shown on mmatinca.eu.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Professional profile: experience, certifications, results
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • portfolio_get_projectOne project by id: the problem it solves, the outcome, the long description (markdown, with relevant links — live site, GitHub where open source) and the list of technical details.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "portfolio_get_project" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One project by id: the problem it solves, the outcome, the long description (markdown, with relevant links — live site, GitHub where open source) and the list of technical details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Full details of one project
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • portfolio_list_blog_postsArticles published on the mmatinca.eu blog (enterprise AI adoption, automation, lessons from practice), newest first: slug, title, excerpt, date.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "portfolio_list_blog_posts" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "portfolio_list_blog_posts" says "list" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Articles published on the mmatinca.eu blog (enterprise AI adoption, automation, lessons from practice), newest first: slug, title, excerpt, date.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List blog articles
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • portfolio_list_projectsAll projects by Marian Matinca (AI Adoption Lead, Bucharest): id, title, category, one-line result, tags, live site.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "portfolio_list_projects" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    All projects by Marian Matinca (AI Adoption Lead, Bucharest): id, title, category, one-line result, tags, live site. Call portfolio_get_project with {id} for full details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List portfolio projects
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:53 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mmatinca.eu/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http portfolio https://mmatinca.eu/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http portfolio https://mmatinca.eu/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_list_projects",
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_get_project",
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_list_blog_posts",
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_get_blog_post",
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_get_profile",
      "mcp__portfolio__portfolio_search"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as portfolio. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__portfolio__portfolio_list_blog_posts untrusted-input
  • mcp__portfolio__portfolio_get_blog_post untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcp/verify?hash=e66b2eac8686b6e1a405dbe2be0de1ff77c5a0a3df579b5ac29565af63ddb5db" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e66b2eac8686, from Nov 15, 2026, 08:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/eu.mmatinca/portfolio-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:12 UTC.

portfolio-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the portfolio-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the portfolio-mcp server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the portfolio-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the portfolio-mcp server have?

6 tools: 6 read. portfolio_list_projects, portfolio_get_project, portfolio_list_blog_posts, portfolio_get_blog_post, portfolio_get_profile and portfolio_search.

Does the portfolio-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the portfolio-mcp server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the portfolio-mcp server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.